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BY ROBERTA S. KARMEL*
ABSTRACT
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) has markedly
changed the boundary between the federal securities laws and state
corporation law with regard to corporate governance. This change has not
been some accident of hasty congressional action in the wake of the Enron,
Worldcom and relatedscandals. The added grants ofauthority given to the
SEC in Sarbanes-Oxley are with respect to matters of board composition
and structure that the SEC has been angling to regulate for some time.
Furthermore, in utilizing the self-regulatory organizations to implement the
new governance ideas of Sabanes-Oxley, the SEC has exercised its powers
under the 1975 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in a
manner long considered questionable. The SEC's new activism with
respect to corporate governance can thus be analyzed as the latest
maneuver in a long running battle between federal and state authorities
over the regulation ofpublic corporations.
Whether Sarbanes-Oxley will result in better corporate governance
and greater sensitivity by corporate officers and directors to investor
interests remains to be seen. Despite the laudatory goals of the statute,
adverse consequences are possible. The provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are
proscriptive in an area where flexibility has long been valued.
Furthermore, it is premised to some extent on an adversarial model of
corporate governance in contrast to a consensus model which has been the
prevailing norm in boardrooms. In changing the orientation of directors,
Sarbanes-Oxley and its implementation by the SEC may result in
diminished entrepreneurial activity, corporate profitability and
competitiveness. The new emphasis on investor protection may detract
attention from long-term business interests. This shift from state to federal
law concerning internal corporate affairs may also cause state law either
to become unduly restrictive of directorial discretion in an effort to
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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal securities laws generally have been considered full
disclosure statutes, as opposed to merit regulation statutes or laws
governing the internal affairs of corporations. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), nevertheless, has aspired to regulate corporate
governance since its inception and, from time to time, has exploited
scandals in the public securities markets to achieve this purpose. Congress
has similarly reacted to scandals by giving the SEC greater power, often to
prosecute wrongdoing the SEC failed to foresee or prevent. Even when
Congress has been operating in a deregulatory mode, federal law still
preempted state law and therefore laid the foundation for further regulation
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by the SEC over time. Where statutory mandates were ambiguous,
however, the courts frequently halted the SEC's reach for jurisdiction to
regulate corporate governance, even though the judicially-constructed
demarcation between federal and state law was little more than a line in the
sand.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002' (Sarbanes-Oxley) markedly
changed the boundary between the federal securities laws and state
corporation laws with regard to corporate governance. This was not an
accident of hasty congressional action in the wake of the Enron, Worldcom,
and related scandals. Rather, the added grants of authority given to the
SEC in Sarbanes-Oxley are with respect to matters of board composition
and structure that the SEC has been angling to regulate for some time.
Furthermore, in utilizing the self-regulatory organizations to implement the
new governance ideas of Sabanes-Oxley, the SEC has exercised its powers
under the 1975 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act)2 in a manner long considered questionable. The SEC's new
activism with respect to corporate governance can thus be analyzed as the
latest maneuver in a long running battle between federal and state
authorities over the regulation of public corporations.
Whether Sarbanes-Oxley will result in better corporate governance
and greater sensitivity by corporate officers and directors to investor
interests remains to be seen. Despite the laudatory goals of the statute,
adverse consequences are possible. The corporate governance provisions
of Sarbanes-Oxley are proscriptive in an area where flexibility has long
been valued. Furthermore, it is premised to some extent on an adversarial
model of corporate governance in contrast to a consensus model which has
been the prevailing norm in boardrooms. In changing the orientation of
directors, Sarbanes-Oxley and its implementation by the SEC may result in
diminished entrepreneurial activity, corporate profitability and
competitiveness. The new emphasis on investor protection may detract
from long-term business interests. Further, this shift from state to federal
law concerning internal corporate affairs may cause state law either to
become unduly restrictive of directorial discretion in an effort to compete
with rigorous SEC enforcement cases, or at the other extreme, to atrophy.
Parts I and II set forth the historical tripartite arrangement for
regulation of corporate governance by state corporation and blue sky laws,
the SEC, and the self-regulatory organizations. Part III discusses changes
to those arrangements. In Part IV, the article analyzes some of the
'Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
215 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mnm (2001).
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implications of shifting the regulation of corporate governance from state
to federal authorities and inquires whether the shareholder primacy model
upon which Sarbanes-Oxley is based is appropriate.
II. THE TRADITIONAL SPHERES OF FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITY
OVER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. A Full Disclosure Mandate
The tension between federal and state control of corporate
governance pits the virtues of uniformity and national economic growth
against a policy of experimentation and decentralized power. State
corporation law is based on principles of free incorporation, the absence of
substantive regulation, and enforcement of fiduciary duty law to protect
shareholders. Federal securities law, however, has relied primarily on
disclosure as a regulatory device to influence the conduct of corporate
managements and boards. When the first of the federal securities laws, the
Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act),3 was passed there was a debate
between advocates of controlling the sale of securities by issuers that were
dishonest or in unsound condition4 and advocates of disclosure as a means
to prevent the sale of poorly capitalized companies.5 State blue sky laws,
which preceded the federal securities laws, generally prevented a
corporation from making a public offering unless it was fair, just and
equitable, as determined by a state official.6 The Securities Act permitted
any corporation to go public if it made full disclosure of its business and
affairs to investors.7
'15 U.S.C. § 77a-z (2000).
4An early draft of the Securities Act would have allowed a government agency to
determine whether issuers were of unsound condition or insolvent. DONALD A. RITCHIE, JAMES
M. LANDIS, DEAN OF THE REGULATORS 45 (1980). Such authority would have been similar to the
ability of state blue sky merit regulators to prevent a public offering of securities if an issuer's
capital structure is substantively unfair or presents excessive risks to investors. See Ad Hoc
Subcommittee on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Securities Committee, Report on
State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 Bus. LAW. 785, 787 (1986) [hereinafter ABA
Blue Sky Report].
'Full disclosure regulation is based on the often quoted theory that "[plublicity is justly
commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).
6ABA Blue Sky Report, supra note 4, at 805.
7A specified list of disclosure items, including the provision of a profit and loss statement
and balance sheet, was attached to the Securities Act as Schedule A to avoid congressional
tinkering although this list was the "guts of the bill" according to one of its drafters. See RICHIE,
supra note 4, at 47.
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Shortly after the Securities Act was passed, William 0. Douglas
(Douglas), who was to exert considerable influence on the SEC as an early
Chairman, criticized the full disclosure philosophy of the statute. In his
view, the Act was a failure because it "presupposes that the glaring light of
publicity will give the investors needed protection," but investors "either
lack the training or intelligence to assimilate ... and find ... useful [the
balance sheets, contracts or other data in the registration statement] or are
so concerned with a speculative profit as to consider them irrelevant."8
Douglas espoused a regulatory theory that was an integral part of a whole
program of industrial regulation and organization. In his view,
administrative control over access to the market must be "lodged not only
in the hands of the new self-disciplined business groups but also in the
hands of governmental agencies whose function would be to articulate the
public interest with the profit motive."9  Regulation of corporate
governance by the SEC was injected into statutes passed after the Securities
Act and intended to curb abuses by specific industries,'" but the SEC was
not given authority to regulate the structure of corporate boards generally,
even when major amendments to the Exchange Act in 1964 gave the SEC
power to direct a continuous disclosure system for all public companies.''
Even the proxy provisions of the Exchange Act 2 generally have been
regarded primarily as disclosure, rather than regulatory provisions.' 3
Similarly, the SEC's regulatory authority over tender offers 4 has been
'William 0. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REv. 521, 523-24 (1934).
91d. at 531.
"MThe Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (2001),
imposed various substantive controls upon the capital structure of public utility companies. The
Investment Company Act of 1940 (Investment Company Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to 80a-64
(2001 & Supp. 2003), created a corporate governance structure for mutual funds and, in
particular, a requirement for control by independent directors. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2001 &
Supp. 2003). The Exchange Act required the registration of stock exchanges and broker-dealers
but did not give the SEC any control over their governance. Similarly, when the Maloney Act
authorized the creation and regulation of national securities associations, 15 U.S.C. § 780-3
(2001), the SEC was not authorized to regulate the corporate governance of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). A limited power to effect the board structure of these
self-regulatory organizations (SROs) was contained in amendments to the Exchange Act passed
in 1975. Exchange Act, §§ 78f(b)(3), 78o-3(b)(4) (2001).
"Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565; see Exchange
Act Release No. 7425, 29 Fed. Reg. 13,455 (Sept. 30, 1964). The SEC previously only had
authority to direct continuous disclosure of exchange listed companies.
2Exchange Act, § 14(a); 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2001).
3See infra notes 266-67 and accompanying text.
1'4Exchange Act, §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (2001).
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interpreted as giving the SEC little authority to determine the outcome of
contests for corporate control. 5
Douglas's vision of an administrative agency that would protect
investors by controlling business was acted upon by the SEC from time to
time, but any ambitious corporate governance program was curbed by
decisions of the courts and the Commission itself. One of the agency's first
corporate governance cases, In re Franchard Corp., involved a stop order
suspending the effectiveness of registration statements that the SEC
deemed materially deficient because of the failure to disclose the use of
company funds for the personal benefit of the issuer's CEO. 6 In a
statement that became a keystone of future SEC programs, the SEC found
that this improper diversion of funds was "germane to an evaluation of the
integrity of his management" and that "[t]his quality is always a material
factor." 7 Nevertheless, although the SEC staff urged that this case be used
to define the duties of corporate directors, the Commission declined to do
so, stating: "The [Securities] Act does not purport... to define Federal
standards of directors' responsibility in the ordinary operations of business
enterprises and nowhere empowers us to formulate administratively such
regulatory standards." 8 When implied rights of action were recognized
under section 10(b)19 and section 14(a)20 of the Exchange Act, federal
courts were similarly tempted to consider cases involving not only
misrepresentation, but also equitable fraud or breaches of fiduciary duty
under state law by corporate managers.2' This led one commentator to
declare that the federal securities laws had given rise to a federal
corporation law.22 The observation proved premature, and in Schoenbaum
v. Firstbrook23 the Second Circuit declined to interpret section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act to permit an action for breach of a fiduciary duty by
'
5See infra notes 29-31.




9See Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Such a right was
not specifically approved by the Supreme Court until 1971 in Superintendent ofIns. v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
20These rights were recognized by the Supreme Court in J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426 (1964). The Court has subsequently noted a stricter approach to finding implied causes of
action in the Exchange Act. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).
2 tSee, e.g., Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp.,
339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
22
"[A] federal law of corporations now exists. But it has always existed-since the
passage of the Securities Act of 1933." Arthur Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An
Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1179 (1965).
23405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968).
[Vol. 30
REALIZING THE DREAM OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS
corporate directors in a shareholder derivative action alleging the sale of
treasury shares to a related corporation at a deflated price.
The Supreme Court, in a non-securities law case, later stated:
"Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds
to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law
expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation."
24
This doctrine was applied in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green25 to quash
the development of a judicially-constructed federal law of corporate
fiduciary duty under section 1 0(b) of the Exchange Act. In Santa Fe, the
minority shareholders in a squeeze out merger contested the appraisal value
of their shares by alleging unfairness and overreaching, as sanctioned by
Delaware statutory law. The Second Circuit took the view that Rule 1 Ob-5
reached "breaches of fiduciary duty by a majority against minority
shareholders without any charge of misrepresentation or lack of
disclosure." 26 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 1 0(b) cases
require deception, manipulation, or nondisclosure.27 In so doing, the Court
rejected the notion that the securities laws "federalize the substantial
portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities,
particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would
be overridden.
2
In Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., the Supreme Court
indicated that Santa Fe would not be confined to its facts, but rather was a
general holding concerning fiduciary duty.29 Schreiber raised the issue of
whether the withdrawal of a hostile tender offer bid and the substitution of
a partial bid, following negotiations with the target company's management,
constituted a "manipulative" act under section 14(e) of the Exchange Act.
The Court held that the term "manipulative" in sections 10(b) and 14(e)
should be similarly interpreted and that manipulative acts require
misrepresentation or nondisclosure." The Court reiterated its reluctance
to displace state corporation law regulating contests for corporate control
in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, when the Court refused to
2 4Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
25430 U.S. 462 (1977).
26Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (2d Cir. 1976).
27Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 476.
2
Id. at 479. After the Santa Fe case, some courts took the view that material non-
disclosure of a breach of fiduciary duty denying minority shareholders an opportunity to seek
relief in a state court stated a section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claim. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Meridor,
567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977).
29472 U.S. 1 (1985).
301d. at 7-8.
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declare a state law making tender offers more difficult preempted by the
securities laws or invalid as a burden on interstate commerce.3'
In a case arising under the Investment Company Act, which specifies
some corporate governance regulation for mutual funds and codifies the
common law duties and obligations of corporate directors generally,32 the
Supreme Court noted that Congress did not intend for the Investment
Company Act to supplant the "entire corpus of state corporation law. 33
The case concerned the ability of investment company directors to
terminate a shareholder derivative suit. The Court reversed a decision that
directors have no power to terminate and stated that federal courts "should
apply state law governing the authority of independent directors to
discontinue derivative suits to the extent such law is consistent with the
policies of the Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers
Act. 34
B. SEC Efforts to Regulate Corporate Governance
Despite the SEC's lack of authority to regulate corporate internal
affairs, the SEC embarked on an activist corporate governance reform
program in the 1970s. This program, in the context of a post-Watergate
hysteria, was an effort to blame business for a prevailing climate of
corruption, a stagflation economy and a long bear market. In 1973, the
Watergate special prosecutor charged several corporations and executive
officers with using corporate funds to make illegal political contributions.35
The SEC first published a statement that nondisclosure of these matters
might involve violations of the federal securities laws,36 then brought
enforcement actions against corporations that made illegal political
"1481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987).
32
nvestment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b) (2001 & Supp. 2003). See Aldred Inv.
Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254, 260 (1st Cir. 1945).
13 Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979).
341d. at 475, 486. Sarbanes-Oxley provides for a federal derivative action in section
306(a)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7244(a)(2) (2002)) when corporate insiders trade during certain
pension black-out periods. Whether this will lead to a new federal law with regard to demand
refusal is an interesting question. See William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New
Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two
Residents of One Small State, , at 8 n. 12 (N.Y. Univ. Center for Law & Business, Working Paper
#CLB 03-01, Feb. 26, 2002, at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=-367720).
"See SEC. & EXCH. COMMN REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE
PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES, 94th Cong., REPORT OF THE SEC & EXCH. COMM'N ON
QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (Comm. Print 1976)
[hereinafter SEC REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS].361d. at 2.
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contributions.37 These investigations, in turn, led to the "questionable
foreign payments" cases, which involved various payments to foreign
government officials to obtain or keep business abroad. In some cases, the
SEC obtained consent injunctions that resulted in the restructuring of
particular corporate boards.3"
As a result of the SEC's sensitive payments program, Congress
amended the federal securities laws in 1977 with the enactment of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.3 9 This law made bribery of foreign
government officials, candidates or political parties by SEC regulated
issuers and certain other domestic concerns a crime.4" It also required
companies registered with the SEC to maintain accurate books and records
and develop a system of internal accounting controls.4 The object of the
SEC's sensitive payments program was not to outlaw the bribery of foreign
officials by U.S. companies, but rather to obtain more power to regulate the
internal affairs of public companies. The SEC achieved this objective by
persuading Congress to enact section 13(b) of the Exchange Act requiring
issuers to make and keep books, records and accounts that accurately and
fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.
The newly-enacted law also required companies to devise and maintain an
adequate system of internal accounting controls to provide reasonable
assurance to auditors with respect to specified transactions.
At this time there was a clamor for a federal chartering law for large
corporations by consumer activist Ralph Nader, former SEC Chairman
William Cary and others.42 Although these authors espoused different
views, many were generally sympathetic to the Nader argument that giant
multinational corporations had become private governments, exercising a
detrimental influence on quality of life for which they were not being held
accountable. Federal chartering, therefore, was needed to restructure the
"See, e.g., SEC v. ITT Corp., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,948
(D.D.C. Aug. 8, 1979); SEC v. Lockheed, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95, 509 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 1976).
3 See SEC REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS, supra note 35, at 3-5.
39Exchange Act, §§ 13(b)(2), 30A, 32; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2), 78dd-1-2, 78ff, added
by Public L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (Dec. 19, 1977).
4015 U.S.C. § 78dd-1-2 (2001).
4 11d. § 78m(b)(2).
42RALPH L. NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663 (1974); Thomas
Hazen, Corporate Chartering and the Securities Markets: Shareholder Suffrage, Corporate
Responsibility and Managerial Accountability, 1978 WIS. L. REv. 391; Joel F. Henning, Federal
Corporate Chartering for Big Business: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 21 DE PAUL L. REV.
915 (1972); Donald E. Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 Bus. LAW.
1125 (1976).
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board of directors, to redefine its relations with managers, employees,
shareholders, and the community and to regulate corporate disclosure and
conduct in areas of social concern.43 Former Chairman Cary expressed
more concern about shareholder rights and advocated federal chartering as
an antidote to the failure of state corporation law to discipline corporate
officers and directors.' Other reform advocates focused upon the poor
economic performance of American business and perceived abuses of trust
by corporate managers and urged that state corporation law be changed to
strengthen corporate boards.45
In this atmosphere of criticism of business leaders, the corporate
governance debate turned to questions of board composition and director
independence and the SEC embarked on a program to influence board
structure. In April of 1977, the SEC announced that it would hold public
hearings concerning shareholder communications, shareholder participation
in the corporate electoral process, and corporate governance in general.46
After these hearings, the SEC proposed rules to encourage boards to
become independent of management. At the very least, in the view of
Harold Williams, then SEC Chairman, a board's nominating, compensation
and audit committees should be composed of independent directors.47
Williams also viewed management remuneration and corporate perquisites
as playing an important, though subtle, role in corporate accountability.48
At this time, however, the only mechanism the SEC could use to implement
boardroom reform was disclosure regulation. Accordingly, the SEC
proposed to require all corporations subject to the SEC's proxy rules to
label their directors as "independent" or "affiliated."49 These rules aroused
a storm of protest,5" and the SEC's final rules required only a brief
description of"significant economic and personal relationships... between
43NADER, supra note 42, at 63-64, 75-179.
"Cary, supra note 42, at 670-84.
45E.g., MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 137-70 (1976).
'Re-examination of Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder
Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process, and Corporate Governance Generally, 42 Fed.
Reg. 23,901 (May 11, 1977).
4 7See Harold M. Williams, Chairman SEC, Corporate Accountability--One Year Later,
Address at the Sixth Annual Securities Regulation Institute, San Diego, Calif. (Jan. 18, 1979)
(transcript available in the Loyola University Law Library).
481d
49Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral
Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 14,970, 43 Fed. Reg.
31,945, 31,947 (July 24, 1978).
"Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral
Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 15,384, 43 Fed. Reg.
58,522, 58,523 (Dec. 14, 1978).
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the director and the issuer."'" In addition, the SEC adopted rules designed
to make disclosure of management remuneration more meaningful and to
eliminate undisclosed management perquisites.
52
The SEC also tried to exert more control in the 1970s over the public
accounting profession. When the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) was formed, the SEC's oversight over the formulation of
accounting principles was clarified.53 The SEC exercised its power to
oversee the development of generally accepted accounting principles by
working together with the FASB to develop more effective methods of oil
and gas accounting for the purpose of disclosure.54 The SEC also addressed
the issue of management consulting by accounting firms, but was politically
unable to eliminate such consulting.55 The SEC was similarly frustrated in
its efforts to achieve clear authority to formulate auditing standards and
discipline accountants. Although auditing standards for accountants who
certify financial statements filed with the SEC were indirectly regulated
5 Id. at 58,524.
12Uniform and Integrated Reporting Requirements: Management Remuneration,
Proposed Amendments to Item 4 of Regulation S-K, Securities Act Release No. 6210, 45 Fed.
Reg. 31,733 (May 14, 1980) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240); Uniform and Integrated
Reporting Requirements: Management Remuneration, Securities Act Release No. 6003,43 Fed.
Reg. 58,181 (Dec. 13, 1978). See also Disclosure of Management Remuneration, Securities Act
Release No. 6166, 44 Fed. Reg. 74,808 (Dec. 18, 1979) (clarifying management remuneration
disclosure requirements).
53 Financial statements filed with the SEC must be certified by an independent certified
accountant, and the SEC has the power to prescribe the detail and content of such financial
statements. See Securities Act, Schedule A, Items 25-27, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aa(25)-(27) (2001).
In addition, the SEC was empowered to define "accounting, technical and trade terms" and
prescribe the form in which required information should be presented, the items to be shown in
the balance sheet and earnings statement, and the methods to be followed in the preparation of
accounts. Securities Act, § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2000). The SEC then assigned considerable
responsibility for formulating accounting principles to private sector organizations like the FASB.
See Accounting Series Release No. 150, 39 Fed. Reg. 1260 (Jan. 7, 1974), 3 S.E.C. Docket 275
(1973-74). See generally James F. Strother, The Establishment of Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles and Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, 28 VAND. L. REV. 201
(1975) (discussing the development and regulation of accounting and auditing standards).
54See Financial Reporting by Oil & Gas Producers, Securities Act Release No. 6294, 46
Fed. Reg. 15,496 (Mar. 6, 1981) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211).
55The SEC is empowered to define the term "independent" and thereby may prevent
auditors from engaging in non-audit services. The Commission considered doing so in 1979, but
then pulled back and mandated disclosure of such services instead. See Scope of Services by
Independent Accountants, Accounting Services Release No. 264, Securities Act Release No.
6078,44 Fed. Reg. 15,920 (June 14, 1979). Even this limited regulation of non-audit services was
subsequently repealed. See Relationships Between Registrants and Independent Accountants,
Securities Act Release No. 6379, 47 Fed. Reg. 5404 (Feb. 5, 1982). Almost twenty years later,
the SEC once again attempted to prohibit accountants from engaging in non-audit services. See
Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, Securities Act Release No.
7919, [2000-2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,406, at 83,989 (Nov. 21,2000).
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through enforcement proceedings, the SEC's authority to bring such
proceedings was continually questioned,56 since accountants were licensed
and disciplined under state law. The SEC's dissatisfaction with the
performance of the large accounting firms continued, but the SEC was
unable to achieve the reforms it thought necessary. 7
In the 1970s, the SEC had an aggressive enforcement program
against securities attorneys, under its Rule 2(e) of its Rules of Practice,58
bringing numerous disciplinary cases before the agency. This program was
seriously questioned and then halted, in part because of doubts over the
SEC's authority to regulate lawyers. Instead, the SEC adopted a policy of
instituting actions against attorneys in court injunctive actions. 9 The SEC
staff chafed at its inability to bring administrative cases against lawyers
under Rule 2(e) and sometimes resorted to other administrative remedies.60
The SEC's ambition to pursue an activist corporate governance
agenda in the 1970s was thwarted by its lack of authority. Nevertheless,
during this time the SEC laid the foundation for increasing its power to
regulate public corporations and their accountants and attorneys as it would
later have the power to do pursuant to the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the politics of regulation underwent a significant
change and deregulation became the order of the day. The SEC then
6This authority was upheld in Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979),
but the nature of such a disciplinary proceeding and the type of proof needed remained
controversial. See Checkosky v. SEC, 139 F.3d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1998). See also Dissenting
Statement of Commissioner Norman S. Johnson, Amendment to Rule 102(e) of the Commission's
Rules of Practice, Securities Act Release No. 7593, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 86,052, at 80,852 (Oct. 19, 1998) (criticizing the amendments to Rule 102(e) clarifying
the Commission's standard for determining "improper professional conduct" as outside the
Commission's authority).
57See ARTHUR LEvITI & PAULA DWYER, TAKE ON THE STREET WHAT WALL STREET AND
CORPORATE AMERICA DON'T WANT YOU TO KNOW, WHAT You CAN Do To FIGHT BACK 105-43
(2002); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRADULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 63-78
(Oct. 1987).
"
8This is now Rule 102(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2004).
"
9See generally Simon M. Lorne & W. Hardy Callcott, Administrative Actions Against
Lawyers Before the SEC, 50 Bus. LAW. 1293 (1995) (discussing SEC Rule 2(e) and the trade-off
between the administrative need to deter or remedy a lawyer's violation of securities laws and the
professional responsibility of an attorney to provide effective legal advice). See also Robert W.
Emerson, Rule 2(e) Revisited: SEC Disciplining ofAttorney Since In re Carter, 29 AM. Bus. L.J.
155 (1991) (reviewing the Rule 2(e) debate and concluding that a disciplinary formula that moves
away from adjudication while maintaining procedures to remove or rehabilitate malfeasant or
incompetent attorneys is a workable compromise).
6°See In re Jeffrey L. Feldman, Admin. Proc. No. 3-8063, Securities Act Release No.
7001, 54 SEC Docket 330 (May 27, 1993). The use of alternative remedies was not always
effective. See, e.g., In re George C. Kern, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 29,356, [1991 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 184,815 (June 21, 1991).
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looked to the market for corporate control to discipline underperforming
managers and tried to become a power in regulating that market. This
effort failed, however, because of court decisions adverse to the SEC.6'
Furthermore, the SEC was not able to fully assert itself in the one share,
one vote controversy. This failure requires an explanation of the role of
stock exchange listing rules in corporate governance.
In the 1990s, the SEC was the beneficiary of federal statutes
preempting state securities law. The National Securities Markets
Improvements Act of 1996 (NSMIA)6 2 preempted state securities law in
three areas. First, it preempted blue-sky securities registration, merit
review and prospectus disclosure requirements for SEC registered
investment companies and stock exchange and Nasdaq listed securities.63
It also preempted blue-sky law in most private placements.' Second,
NSMIA preempted state regulation of broker-dealers with respect to
capital, custody, margin, financial responsibility, records, bonding, and
reporting requirements to the extent state regulation was inconsistent with
federal law.65 Third, the SEC was given exclusive regulatory authority over
investment advisers to SEC registered investment companies and advisers
with $25 million or more in assets under management. 66 In addition, the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA)67 curbed
state law securities class action suits, providing that no class action based
on state law alleging fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a
"covered security" may be maintained in state or federal court and any such
action shall be removable to a federal district court and dismissed.68 While
such preemption did not give the SEC specific authority to regulate
corporate governance, it did provide a precedent for supplanting other areas
of state law relating to public companies.
6 1See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69,83 (1987); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985).
6 2National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat.
3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
6315 U.S.C. § 77r (2001).
64Id.
651d. § 78o(h)(1).
"Investment Adviser Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(b)(1)(A) (2001).
67Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
6815 U.S.C. § 77p(b)-(c) (2001).
2005]
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
C. The Role of Stock Exchange Listing Requirements
Stock exchange listing requirements preceded both the federal
securities laws and state blue sky laws. Written agreements between
issuers and stock exchanges were initially enforceable only as a matter of
contract law. As early as 1900, New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (NYSE)
listing agreements included a provision requiring companies to distribute
annual reports to stockholders. 9 In 1909, the NYSE added the requirement
that stockholders hold an annual meeting.7° Congress closely tracked
NYSE listing requirements in drafting the disclosure provisions of the
Exchange Act.71 Even after the Act was passed, the NYSE remained
concerned with the corporate governance practices of listed companies,
adding such requirements as the need to obtain shareholder approval for
any acquisition of assets from an insider resulting in a twenty percent
dilution of outstanding shares and the need to have two outside directors on
corporate boards.72 In 1977, at the insistence of the SEC, the NYSE
adopted a listing standard requiring all domestic companies to establish and
maintain "an audit committee comprised solely of directors independent of
management and free from any relationship that.., would interfere with
the exercise of independent judgment as a committee member. 73
Although the Exchange Act as passed in 1934 granted the SEC
authority to abrogate and amend self-regulatory organization (SRO) rules,
including listing standards, the SEC never used this authority during the
period from 1934 to 1975."4 Then, in 1975, amendments to the Exchange
Act gave the SEC significantly more power over SROs, including the
power to approve or disapprove SRO rule changes and to unilaterally
change SRO rules.7 5 Not much attention was paid, in 1934 or in 1975, to
the question of whether this power transformed listing requirements from
state contract law provisions into federal regulations. The failure of the
69Special Study Group, Special Stud, on Market Structure, Listing Standards and
Corporate Governance, 57 Bus. LAW. 1487, 1498 (2002) [hereinafter Special Study].
701d
7 1A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REv. 925, 1008 (1999).
7 2Special Study, supra note 69, at 1500. For a summary of current corporate governance
standards of the NYSE and the NASD, see id. at 1510-13.
"See New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Order Approving Proposed Rule Change,
Exchange Act Release No. 13,346, 42 Fed. Reg.14,793, 14,794 (Mar. 16, 1977).
See Special Study, supra note 69, at 1517.
"Exchange Act, § 19(b)-(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)-(c) (2001).
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NYSE, however, to enforce its one share, one vote listing requirement76 in
the mid 1980s led to litigation concerning this question.
In response to the takeover boom of the mid and late 1980s many
companies effected dual class recapitalizations in order to defend against
unwelcome tender offers. At this time, the American Stock Exchange
(Amex) permitted listed companies to have disparate voting rights for their
common shares while the Nasdaq market had no rules on voting rights; this
competitive threat motivated the NYSE to abandon its one share, one vote
listing requirement.77 In response, after failing to persuade the exchanges
to voluntarily adopt a uniform voting rights rule, the SEC adopted its own
rule to the Exchange Act, requiring the exchanges to bar the listing of a
domestic corporations's securities if that company acted disparately to
reduce the per share voting rights of existing stockholders.78 The validity
of this rule was tested in Business Roundtable v. SEC,79 on the ground that
the rule directly controlled the substantive allocation of powers among
classes of shareholders and therefore exceeded the SEC's authority under
section 19 of the Exchange Act.80 The court found that the SEC regulation
was a "rule" under sections 19(b) and (c) of the Exchange Act, but that it
was not "in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act."'" The court's
rationale was that there was no indication that Congress intended to permit
such broad federal preemption over corporate governance and shareholder
rights-matters traditionally left to state law.82 This decision establishes the
SEC's inability to create a comprehensive federal corporate law through
listing standards. Instead, SEC authority over corporate governance listing
standards must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis with respect to a
specific Exchange Act purpose.83
76NYSE Listed Company Manual § 313.00(A) & (C) (repealed 1994); NYSE'SProposed
Rule Changes on Disparate Voting Rights, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1389 (Sept. 19, 1986).
Beginning in 1926 the NYSE refused to list any company with nonvoting common stock or any
company with more than one class of common stock having disparate voting rights. Then in 1984
General Motors and other companies violated this policy and were not delisted and in 1986 the
NYSE modified its rule. See Voting Rights Listing Standards; Disenfranchisement Rule,
Exchange Act Release No. 25,891, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,376 (July 12, 1988) [hereinafter
Disenfranchisement Rule].
"Id. See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One
Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 687, 688, 707 (1986).
7 Disenfranchisement Rule, supra note 76.
'9905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
'old. at 407.
8 1d. at 409-17.
2Id. at 408.
3Special Study, supra note 69, at 1525.
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Because Sarbanes-Oxley greatly enlarged the scope of the Exchange
Act as to specific matters of corporate governance, the SEC acquired
greater freedom to utilize SRO listing standards to accomplish corporate
governance reform. In implementing Sarbanes-Oxley the SEC has made
ample use of this new authority, raising the interesting question of how the
line in the sand between federal and state regulation of a corporation's
internal affairs should now be drawn. This question may be addressed in
the context of SEC rulemaking to mandate that shareholder nominations for
directors be included in management's proxy solicitation under certain
circumstances.84
D. Preemption of State Blue Sky Laws
When the Securities Act and the Exchange Act were passed,
Congress did not exempt state law. To the contrary, "savings clauses" were
inserted in both statutes.85 As a result, state blue sky laws, which imposed
a variety of corporate governance restrictions on companies making public
offerings of their securities continued to co-exist with the federal securities
and state corporation laws. These blue sky laws included such provisions
as restrictions on the offering price relative to book value or some other
metric, anti-dilution regulations, and restrictions on promoters' and
underwriters' compensation.86 Listed issuers were generally exempt from
these requirements, however, because most state securities laws provided
an exemption from their securities registration requirements for such
issuers." Although the SEC never had authority or attempted to impose
such merit standards on IPO offerings, the NASD did so through its
regulation of underwriters.88
The federal securities laws and state blue sky laws co-existed until
1996 when Congress passed NSMIA, and preempted most blue sky
securities registration and merit review. 89 The congressional justification
for such preemption was that the system of dual federal and state securities
8See infra text accompanying notes 266-74.
"
5See Russell A. Smith, State "Blue Sky"Laws and the Federal Securities Acts, 34 MICH.
L. REv. 1135, 1160 (1936).
86See Roberta S. Karmel, Blue Sky Merit Regulation: Benefit to Investors or Burden on
Commerce?, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 105, 117 n.51, 126 tbl. 1(1987).
See Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Securities
Committee, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 Bus. LAW. 785, 792-93
(1986).
"Conduct Rule 2710-2730, N.A.S.D. Manual (2003).
9Supra notes 62-66.
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regulation was unnecessarily redundant, costly, and ineffective.9" While
NSMIA did not give the SEC powers akin to those of a merit regulator, by
preempting state merit regulation the statute put the SEC in a position to
impact underwriting practices and compensation, either directly or though
NASD rulemaking. Current investigations and rulemaking regarding
underwriting abuses exceed the scope of this article, but some of the
problems being addressed have corporate governance implications.9
Further, there is a serious power struggle in progress between state and
federal authorities in this area.92
E. Delaware Case Law
Much has been written on the regulatory competition between the
states for corporate charters93 while less attention has been given to
competition between the SEC and state legislators and judges.94 With
90H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-864, at 39 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3920.
91For example, one practice which has led to some prosecutions involves "spinning"
whereby favored customers buy initial public offerings, the price immediately rises, and these
favored customers sell at a substantial profit. When the favored customers are officers and
directors of underwriting clients there is a question as to whether these officers have breached
state fiduciary duties as well as federal and state securities laws. See Therese H. Maynard,
Spinning in a Hot 1PO-Breach of Fiduciary Duty or Business as Usual?, 43 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2023 (2002); NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
10 (May 2003).
92See Charles Gasparino, Cleaning Up Wall Street: Morgan Stanley Goes to Washington,
WALL ST. J., June 21, 2002, at C 1; Richard Hill, PanelPostpones Action on Bill Panned by States
for Stripping Power, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1243 (July 28, 2003); Tim Lauricella et al.,
Morgan Stanley Case Illustrates States' Strategy, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2003, at B 1. See also
Stephen M. Cutler, Remarks at the F. Hodge O'Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium
(Feb. 21, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch022103smc.htm (discussing the
competing role of federal and state securities regulation).
93The seminal article on the subject was Cary, supra note 42, arguing that the competition
for corporate charters led to a race to the bottom respecting legal standards and therefore a
minimum federal standard in corporate law was necessary. In response to Professor Cary, others
argued that such competition led to a race to the top. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law,
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). See
also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 1-40 (1991) (explaining that states with the best laws attract the most corporate investment);
ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1-2 (1993) (discussing state
competition to attract corporations). This debate continues. See, e.g, Lucian Ayre Bebchuk &
Allen Ferrell, On Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 57 Bus. LAW. 1047 (2002);
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention in Corporate Law, 87
VA. L. REV. 961 (2001); Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and
the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103 (2002).
94Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003); Jonathan R.
Macey, Displacing Delaware: Can the Feds Do a Better Job Than the States in Regulating
Takeovers?, 57 BUS. LAW. 1025 (2002).
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respect to control contests, state legislators frequently have put anti-
takeover statutes in place, whereas the policy of the SEC has been at least
neutral as between bidders and targets, if not tilted toward bidders.95 In the
end, the Supreme Court upheld the state statutes even though the SEC
believed they should have been preempted.96 In another chapter of the
story, when the Delaware Supreme Court held that an issuer could defend
against a hostile bid by instituting an issuer self-tender addressed to all
shareholders but the bidder,97 the SEC responded by adopting the all-
holders rule prohibiting such conduct.98
A substantial number of listed companies are incorporated in
Delaware.99 As the preeminent authority on state corporate law, the
Delaware courts have frequently reacted to federal securities law
developments by changing interpretations of Delaware law. The SEC on
the other hand often reacts to Delaware case law developments through
rulemaking to overcome or clarify doctrines that the SEC believes do not
provide investors adequate protection, as it did by adopting the all-holders
rule. A good example of this dialogue between the Delaware courts and the
SEC occurred after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Santa Fe.'° After the
Court rejected the plaintiffs claims that breaches of fiduciary duty could be
a federal action and that a freezeout merger without a corporate business
purpose was fraudulent underRule lOb-5, '° the Delaware courts were
challenged to express greater concern for minority shareholder interests in
going-private transactions. The Delaware Supreme Court, in response, held
that a long-form merger made for the sole purpose of freezing out minority
shareholders was an abuse of the corporate process and a breach of duty.0 2
Then, in 1979, the SEC passed Rule 13e-3, which requires the issuer in a
going-private transaction to disclose the true purpose of the transaction and
alternative ways of achieving that purpose, the probable detriments and
benefits to the issuer and minority shareholders, and whether the issuer
9 5See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 627-33 (1982).
96CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 83 (1987).
97Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985).
98Rules 13e-4(f), 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f), l4d-10 (2004).
"See Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in
American Corporations, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. SuPP. 317, 339 (1998).




0 2Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977). In Tanzer v. Int'l Gen.
Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Del. 1977), the court similarly held a cashout merger was
proper so long as it was for a bonafide purpose and entirely fair to the minority.
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believes the transaction is fair to unaffiliated holders."°3 A few years later,
in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., ° the Delaware Supreme Court held that a
parent tender offer for shares of a 50.5% owned subsidiary had to be
entirely fair to the minority; this meant fair dealing and fair price.'0° In
view of this holding and an expanded appraisal remedy, however, the court
abandoned the Singer business purpose test.
10 6
Although the SEC has generally managed to utilize disclosure
requirements as a prophylactic device to achieve some modification of
corporate conduct, the agency has chafed at being unable to directly
regulate corporate behavior. Furthermore, the SEC has viewed the absence
of any regulation of corporate board structure negatively.0 7 In this
connection it should be noted that state corporate law does not have
regulatory requirements dictating particular board structures, including
whether or not any independent directors are required on boards or
particular committees such as the audit committee.0 Legislators have
instead remained silent on this issue so that corporations could deal with it
flexibly and good corporate practices could develop over time.'09 Delaware
courts have dealt with issues of board structure and independent directors
in cases enforcing fiduciary duties"0 or in certain specific contexts such as
whether demand needs to be made in a derivative case."' Very generally,
the courts have encouraged boards to have independent directors by
'
0 317 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2004). The SEC initially hoped to go much further than a
disclosure rule, mandating substantive fairness in going-private transactions, but could not find
the authority for such a rule. Dale Arthur Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts:
Creating or Appropriating Shareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REv. 207, 246 (1988).




06 d. at 712. In Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001), the
Delaware Supreme Court limited Weinberger to long-form mergers. Id. at 248.
"°TSee supra text accompanying notes 46-52.
108See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, § 5.5
(2002) (discussing the myriad of proposals designed to fill in the perceived deficiency in state
corporate codes that do little either to define the composition or function of the board).
109See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 93 (describing state corporate
codes as "enabling statutes" that allow economics and experience to shape corporate structure).
"
0 See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 923 (Del. 2000); Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694
A.2d 422, 429 (Del. 1997); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d
34,44 (Del. 1994); Cooke v. Oolie, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 89 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2000), reprinted
in 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 609 (2001).
...See, e.g., Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988); Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984); Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1037-40 (N.Y. 1996).
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scrutinizing the actions of non-independent directors with greater
skepticism.1 2
III. CHANGES EFFECTED BY SARBANES-OXLEY
Sarbanes-Oxley was passed in response to the bursting of the stock
market bubble of the late 1990s, and the uncovering of widespread financial
fraud at large public companies that had been high fliers during the boom
in technology stocks."3 The demise of Enron, Adelphia Communications,
Qwest, Global Crossing, WorldCom, and other companies resulted in
enormous losses to shareholders and employees of the companies affected,
not only of their jobs, but also of their pensions.l"' Without inquiring too
deeply into the reasons for the bubble and its collapse, or why accounting
irregularities at public companies had become so pervasive, Congress
passed Sarbanes-Oxley to restore investor confidence. The statute was
based primarily on recommendations from the SEC, and in the process the
SEC acquired the power to regulate corporate governance at large public
companies and to exercise much more regulation of auditors and attorneys.
A stock market bubble is primarily psychological and perhaps there
was little anyone could have done to prick this bubble more promptly." 5
Politicians, however, are even more loathe than others to announce that the
emperor is wearing no clothes. After Alan Greenspan observed that the
stock market was suffering from "irrational exuberance," the Federal
"
2See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Communications Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1120-21 (Del. 1994);
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,710 (Del. 1983); Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec.
Co., 121 N.E. 378, 379-80 (N.Y. 1918).
..
3About 1,000 companies had to restate earnings in the five years prior to the enactment
of Sarbanes-Oxley. See Jeff Madrick, Economic Scene-Bush is Talking Tough on Corporate
Ethics, but Where is the Regulatory Bite?, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2002, at C2. According to a
Report of the General Accounting Office approximately ten percent of publicly traded companies
restated their financials between 1997 and 2001. United States General Accounting Office,
Report to the Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate,
Financial Statement Restatements: Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses and Remaining
Challenges, at 15 (Comm. Print 2002).
..
4See JOHN T. BOSTELMAN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DESKBOOK §§ 2:1.2-2.3, 2:4.2-2:6
(2003). See also Susan J. Stabile, Enron, Global Crossing, and Beyond: Implications for
Workers, 76 St. John's L. Rev. 815, 819-24 (2002) (discussing the disproportionate impact of
stock failure on workers compared to executives).
'"See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits in the Stock Markets: A
Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 135, 143-47 (2002);
Symposium, Enron; What Went Wrong?, 8 FoRDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. S1, S5-S6 (2002).
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Reserve Board did nothing to dampen such optimism."6 The financial
shenanigans at Enron probably were discernable from Enron's SEC
filings," 7 but the SEC did not review any of Enron's filings perhaps
because, throughout the 1990s, Congress was extremely niggardly with
finding for the agency. 8 Although the SEC was collecting huge fees from
registrants during the 1990s, the SEC budget requests were repeatedly
denied. '9 Assuming that any politician would want to end a feel good bull
market economy, Congress was so corrupted by campaign contributions
that it could not have blown the whistle on Enron. 2 Moreover, to the
extent that misaligned compensation incentives were one cause of the stock
market bubble,' 2' Congress actually contributed to the problem by
..
6See Chairman Alan Greenspan, Remarks at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer
Lecture of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/I 996/19961205.htm (Dec. 5, 1996). It has
been argued that the Fed played a "key role in nurturing the equity bubble of the late 1990s by
holding down interest rates." See Breaking the Deflationary Spell-World Economy, THE
ECONOMIST, June 28, 2003, at 23, 25. The Fed could also have increased the fifty percent
securities margin requirement, a level it declined to increase in June 1995 or thereafter. See Justin
Fox, Fed Would Ax Some Reg TRestrictions, but Maintain 50% Margin Requirement, 160 AM.
BANKER, June 29, 1995, at 11. Although this might not have been very effective in view of the
growth of derivatives, it might have put a brake on the speculation by individual investors in
margin accounts.
"'See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TULANE
L. REV. 1275, 1299-332 (2002); Anthony H. Catanach, Jr. & Shelley Rhoades-Catanach, Enron:
A Financial Reporting Failure?, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1057, 1074 (2003).
"'Press Release, Senate Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Report
Reveals "Systematic and Catastrophic Failure" of Financial Oversight in Enron Case (Oct. 7,
2002), available at http://govt-aff.senate.gov/1 00702pressO2.htm.
"
9See David Rogers, House Approves $37.7 Billion Spending Measure, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 6, 1999, at A2; Michael Schroeder & Greg Ip, Imperfect Guardian: SEC Faces Hurdles
Beyond Low Budget in Stopping Fraud Legal Limits, Entrenched Ways Will Affect How Well It
Meets New Expectations, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2002, at Al. See also Office of the Executive
Director of the SEC, Self Funding Study, Submitted in Response to the Request of the Securities
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Jan. 1989), in SEC
Study on Self-Funding: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. 91 (Dec. 20, 1988) (discussing the
Commission's lack of sufficient resources).
.
2
.Of the 248 Senators and House representatives serving on the I I congressional
committees that investigated Enron after it collapsed, 212 received campaign contributions from
Enron or Anderson. Don Van Natta Jr., Enron or Andersen Made Donations to Almost All Their
Congressional Investigators, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at C4.
121See John C. Coffee, Jr., What CausedEnron? A Capsule Social and Economic History
of the 1990's, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 269, 275 (2004).
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interfering in the attempt by the FASB to treat stock options as corporate
expenses.'
The purpose of this litany of governmental actors who might be
blamed for investor losses that preceded the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley is
to suggest that the hearings preceding the statute were, at least in part, an
effort by Congress to blame business instead of government for the nation's
economic woes, and that the statute was, at least in part, an effort by the
SEC to obtain more power over public companies and to facilitate
prosecutions of business for derelictions that were already illegal. It is
probably appropriate for the SEC to have greater power over the accounting
profession; this is an issue that was studied and debated for years. Perhaps
making high-ranking corporate officers individually responsible for a
corporation's financial statements will lead to more accurate and more
meaningful financial disclosure. Probably executive greed has become so
completely out of control that substantive regulation of executive
compensation is the only way to curb management remuneration. Perhaps
investor protection requires some regulation of the legal profession by the
SEC. But the implications of federalizing all of this regulation was not
considered or debated in Congress before Sarbanes-Oxley was passed. The
newspapers were full of corporate scandals and the SEC, Congress, and the
White House felt they had to act to satisfy angry constituents.'23 Sarbanes-
Oxley was thus enacted amidst much laudatory self-congratulation, 24 the
Congress directed the SEC to implement its provisions, in many cases
122See LEvITT & DWYER, supra note 57, at 241-43. Despite the many efforts to bolster
independence on the part of those who set accounting standards, Congress is once again
interfering with decision making at the FASB on stock options. See Moving the Market: House
Panel Set to Rein in FASB on Options Rule, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2004, at C3.
123See Meg Richards, Corporate Reform, THE CINCINNATI POST, July 28, 2003, at B7.
Ironically, SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt, who was one of the masterminds behind Sarbanes-Oxley
was driven out of office because of criticism from both the left and the right. See Abigail Rayner,
WorldCom Checks Its Accounts for "Further Irregularities," THE TIMES OF LONDON, July 2,
2002, at 27; On the same day in October 2002 the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times
called for the resignation of Harvey Pitt as SEC Chairman. Cleaning Up Dodge, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 10, 2002, at A14; Revenge of the Accountants, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2002, at A38.
124President George W. Bush called Sarbanes-Oxley "the most far-reaching reforms of
American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt." Elisabeth Bumiller,
Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at Al. SEC
Commissioner Harvey J. Goldschmid called Sarbanes-Oxley the "most sweeping reform since the
New Deal." Shanon D. Murray, Is SEC Ready for Its Own Sweeping Changes?, N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 29, 2002, at 6.
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within a very short time period,'25 and the country turned to the 2002
congressional elections.1
26
Because Sarbanes-Oxley and its implementing regulations are
exceedingly complex and prolix, this article will not attempt to discuss
every provision of the statute, but will only highlight those provisions that
particularly impact upon the federalization of corporate governance and the
federalization of the regulation of accountants and attorneys for public
companies.
A. Certifications
Sarbanes-Oxley requires the SEC to adopt rules requiring the
principal executive and financial officers of SEC registered issuers to
certify annual and quarterly reports filed with the SEC.1 27 The signing
officers must certify that: he or she has reviewed the report, it does not
contain untrue or misleading statements, it fairly presents in all material
respects the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer, and
the signing officers are responsible for establishing and maintaining
internal controls, have designed such controls to ensure that material
information is made known to such officers and others and have evaluated
such controls.128 Further, there are criminal penalties provided for false
certifications. 1
29
A related mandated disclosure is that companies include in their
annual reports an assessment of their internal controls. 3 1 Under the SEC's
final rules, an issuer's annual report must include: a statement of the
management's responsibility over internal controls and reporting; a
statement on the framework used to evaluate those controls over the past
year; management's assessments of the effectiveness of these controls over
the past year, with an identification of any material weaknesses; and a
2
'See Wishy- Washy-New Governance Rules from the SEC, ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 2003,
at 60.
12 6Although the Democrats tried to make corporate wrongdoing a campaign issue, this
ploy was unsuccessful. The Republicans took control of both houses of Congress in November
2002. See Deborah McGregor, Bush Knows War May Not Win Vote, FINANCIALTIMES, Sept. 24,
2002, at 11; Congress: Point My Finger, AM. POLITICAL NETWORK-THE HOTLINE, July 19,
2002, at 5; Adam Nagourney, Republicans Point Corporate Abuse Finger at Democrats, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2002, at A16.
'
27Sarbanes-Oxley, § 302(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2002).
"'
28Id. These provisions have been implemented by rules 13a-14, 13a-15, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.13a-14, 13a-15 (2004). See Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and
Annual Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8124, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,276 (Sept. 9, 2002).
"
29Sarbanes-Oxley, § 906(c), 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c) (2002).
"
30This disclosure is required by Sarbanes-Oxley, § 404(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (2002).
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statement that the issuer's auditors have attested to the management's
assessment of internal controls. 3 '
Prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC proposed a rule
requiring the certification of financial statements by executive officers. 32
After WorldCom's restatement announcement, the SEC even ordered the
principal executive officers and principal financial officers of 947 named
public companies to file a one-time certification about the accuracy of those
companies' SEC filings, claiming authority for this order under an
investigative section of the statute never previously utilized for such a
purpose. ' Although the SEC's authority for such an order was
questionable, 3 4 Sarbanes-Oxley made such questions moot.
The filing of false or misleading financial statements with the SEC
has long been subject to a variety of sanctions in SEC proceedings, criminal
cases, and private litigation. Whether a CEO or CFO could be held liable
for such statements generally depended on an analysis of the particular
facts of a case. '35 The new certification requirement probably will make it
easier to prosecute top executive officers in such situations, but will not
prevent the filing of fraudulent financial statements.136 The legal
requirement that corporations have adequate systems of internal controls
dates back to the 1977 amendments to the Exchange Act discussed
above.' This need for directors to be concerned about internal control
systems in fulfilling their duty of care responsibilities has been referred to
in Delaware case law.' Sarbanes-Oxley adds another layer of legal
obligation to this standard by imposing direct responsibility on executive
3
'See Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Exchange Act Release No. 47,986,
68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 8, 2003).
132Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, Exchange Act
Release No. 46,079, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,877, 41,879 (June 20, 2002).
.
3 Order Requiring the Filing of Sworn Statements Pursuant to Section 21(a)(l) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, File No. 4-460, at www.sec.gov/rules/other/4-460.htm (June 27,
2002).
,
34In the past, the author questioned the SEC's use of Section 2 1(a) for enforcement
purposes. See In re Spartek, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,567, 16 SEC Docket
1094-1 (Feb. 14, 1979) (Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting).
'Liability could have been predicated on the theory that the officer or director was a
direct participant in an accounting fraud, an aider and abettor or a control person. See, e.g., In re
Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. Sec. Litig., 733 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); General Elec. Co. v.
Rowe, No. 89-7644, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15036 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1992).
11
6See SEC Charges HealthSouth Corp., CEO Richard Scrushy With $1.4 Billion
Accounting Fraud, Litigation Release 18,044 (Mar. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl 8044.htm.
'37See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
1
38See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-70 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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officers for the establishment and maintenance of internal control systems.
There is no question that internal control systems are extremely important
and are the predicate for accurate and reliable financial reporting in today's
complex business environment. But do the new certification requirements
really ensure the reliability of financial statements by adding layers of
bureaucratic review that is costly and time consuming?' 39
The certification provision is of note because it gives the SEC direct
regulatory authority over corporate officers of all public companies. The
SEC was also given the power to bar executives from serving as corporate
officers in administrative proceedings without the need to go to court.'4°
This may seem like a negligible addition to the SEC's existing authority
since corporations were already required to file accurate financial
statements with the SEC and to have adequate systems of internal controls,
but the SEC could well use this new authority to regulate corporate officers
in ways not contemplated by the Congress that passed Sarbanes-Oxley.
B. Executive Compensation and Loans
During the 1990s, executive compensation reached exorbitant levels.
In 1980, the ratio of CEO pay to the pay of rank and file employees was 42
to 1; in the early 1990s it surged to 120 to 150 to 1. It then rose to about
475 to 500 to 1 by the end of the decade.' 4 ' It has been argued that this
disparity was due in part to the shareholder primacy norm.. 42 It can also
be argued that shareholders have inadequately constrained executive
compensation norms, and that executive compensation is set by the
managers with little outside control."' Although the setting of executive
compensation is a self-dealing transaction, there has been a curious absence
ofjudicial review of CEO pay, and instead a deference to market forces to
"'These requirements have spawned much work for corporate advisors suggesting ways
in which officers can comply with the new regulations. See, e.g., BOSTELMAN, supra note 114,
§ 5.3.4-6.
4
°Sarbanes-Oxley § 1105(0,15 U.S.C.§ 78u-3(f) (2002). Previously, the SEC could only
obtain such bars by way of a court order.
"'See Susan J. Stabile, One for A, Two for B, and Four Hundred for C. The Widening
Gap in Pay Between Executives and Rank and File Employees, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 115,
115-16 (2002).
1421d. at 117, 134.
'
4 3 See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in
the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 751 (2002) (arguing that a
"managerial power approach" in which boards deviate from optimal compensation schemes
because directors are influenced by or sympathetic to management more accurately explains
excessive executive compensation arrangements).
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determine appropriate compensation levels.'" The SEC's traditional
approach to executive compensation was through disclosure regulation,
with an implicitly strong suggestion that the compensation committee
should be composed of independent directors.145 Although annual
compensation paid to the CEO and four other highest paid officers of
public companies in excess of $1 million may not be deducted as an
ordinary and necessary business expense,'46 this legislative effort to cap
executive pay has either been avoided through the structure of contingent
compensation schemes or ignored.'47
The campaign by institutional investors in the 1990s to align
management compensation with shareholder interests only made matters
worse because this idea placed a portion of CEO compensation at risk
according to a performance based formula devised by compensation
consultants beholden to management. 48  Stock option grants were a
significant component of CEO compensation in part because such options
were not treated as a cost for financial reporting purposes.'4 9 In a rising
market these options and other stock based compensation arrangements
became very valuable. 50 It can be argued that the widespread use of stock
options were a key cause of the 1990s stock market bubble and its collapse.
The equity-based compensation formulas that became so popular shifted
the focus of corporate executives to stock market prices and away from
more traditional metrics of business prosperity and growth, and provided
'Generally, where there is a self-dealing transaction, the transaction will be voidable
unless it is disclosed to and approved by disinterested directors; it is disclosed to and approved
by disinterested shareholders; or it is fair to the corporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 144 (2001); N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 713(a) (2003). State statutes, however, permit directors to
fix their own compensation, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(h) (2001); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
L. § 713(e) (2003), and the test for upholding management remuneration is that it only needs to
be reasonable, rather than fair. See, e.g., Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. Ch.
1997); Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 892 (Del. Ch. 1999). See also AM. LAW
INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.05
(1994) (recommending that large publicly held corporations be required to have an independent
audit committee). In a particularly egregious recent case, a derivative suit alleging waste survived
a motion to dismiss, perhaps a harbinger of a change in judicial deference to directors in setting
executive compensation. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
14'See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962, 57 Fed.
Reg. 48,126 (Oct. 21, 1992).
'
46 1.R.C. § 162(m)(1), 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(1) (2003).
147See Stabile, supra note 141, at 159-61.
14'See id. at 133-41; Bebchuk et al., supra note 143, at 789-93.
14'See Laura Jereski, Found Money: Stock-Option Exercise is Bringing Many Firms a
Big Break on Taxes They Needn't Spend Money to Get the Deduction; That Stirs Controversy;
Hidden Cost: Big Buybacks, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1997, at A1.
'
5
°See Stabile, supra note 141, at 140-41.
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strong incentives to manipulate accounting principles and financial
statements.151
Although Congress did not try to limit executive compensation
directly, several provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, all of which are self-
executing, were directed at specific management compensation abuses.
First, where an issuer must file an accounting restatement due to
misconduct, the CEO and CFO must return any bonus, incentive, or equity-
based compensation, or profits from the sale of the issuer's securities during
the twelve month period following the publication of the financial
statement. 52  Second, to give some teeth to this provision, Congress
authorized the SEC to freeze assets to prevent an issuer from paying
bonuses to executives in cases involving financial fraud. '53 Third, directors
and executive officers of issuers are prohibited from trading in any equity
securities of the issuer during any employee fund blackout period ."'
These provisions were in response to well-publicized abuses at Enron and
other companies prior to the time Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted,'55 and were
relatively noncontroversial. The fourth provision of Sarbanes-Oxley that
affected management compensation prohibited companies from extending,
maintaining or arranging for the extension of credit to any director or CEO
of any public company.'56 This section proved very disruptive of standard
arrangements at many corporations. For example, questions concerning
indemnification advances, travel advances, personal use of a company car,
split dollar life insurance, and cashless option exercises have been so
pervasive that twenty-five major law firms released a joint outline
describing their views on interpretive issues with respect to the prohibition
against loans to CEOs.'57
Although the foregoing provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley were
addressed to specific outrageous abuses, regulation of any aspect of
executive compensation is a major step in the federalization of corporate
governance. The widespread consensus that executive compensation
'Coffee, supra note 121, at 273-78.
11
2Sarbanes-Oxley, § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2002).
"'Sarbanes-Oxley, § 1103, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (2002).
114Sarbanes-Oxley, § 306, 15 U.S.C. § 7244 (2002).
'The loans made to executives of Tyco International Ltd., which were exposed shortly
before Sarbanes-Oxley was signed, were particularly egregious. See Andrew Ross Sorkin &
Susan Saulny, Former Tyco Chief Faces New Charges, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at C1.
'
5 6Sarbanes-Oxley, § 402(k), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (2002).
'"See BOSTELMAN, supra note 114, §§ 13:2.1-2.6.
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became out of control during the 1990s 58 could become a populist rallying
cry for reform of management remuneration. As a result, the SEC could be
pressured to use Sarbanes-Oxley as a means to reign in executive pay
possibly through regulation of corporate compensation committees or SRO
listing rules.
C. Codes of Ethics and Whistleblowers
Sarbanes-Oxley requires the SEC to issue rules to require issuers to
disclose whether they have codes of ethics applicable to senior financial
officers.'59 Accordingly, the SEC passed implementing rules requiring
issuers to disclose in their annual reports whether a code of ethics has been
adopted and to file such a code with the SEC. I ° The way in which the SEC
defined the term "code of ethics" is quite broad and was interpreted to
mean:
written standards that are reasonably designed to deter
wrongdoing and to promote:
(1) Honest and ethical conduct, including the
ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts
of interest between personal and professional
relationships;
(2) Full, fair, accurate, timely, and under-
standable disclosure in reports and documents
that a registrant files with, or submits to, the
Commission and in other public communica-
tions made by the registrant;
'
58See generally THE CONFERENCE BOARD, COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE
ENTERPRISE, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, PT. 1 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (Sept. 17,
2002) (noting a widespread perception of lack of fairness with regard to executive compensation).
See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57
BuS. LAW. 1403, 1413-19 (2002) (explaining incentive to engage in short-term stock price
maximization where executives are compensated with stock options); Tod Perry & Mark Zenner,
CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation?, 35
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123 (2000) (expressing little surprise that executive compensation has
become a political issue). Cf. Marc J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum ofExecutive Compensation,
35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2000) (arguing that majority of current research does not support
conclusion that CEOs are overpaid).
159Sarbanes-Oxley, § 406, 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (2002).
"Item 406 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.406 (2004). See Disclosure Required by
Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Securities Act Release No. 8177, 68
Fed. Reg. 5110 (Jan. 31, 2003).
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(3) Compliance with applicable governmental
laws, rules and regulations;
(4) The prompt internal reporting of
violations of the code to an appropriate person
or persons identified in the code; and
(5) Accountability for adherence to the
code.' 6 '
The SEC rules do not specify the exact details that must be included in a
code of ethics or any specific language that must be used. Some of the
matters have been included in SRO proposed rules. 62 The open-ended
nature of the Sarbanes-Oxley provisions regarding codes of ethics and the
SEC rules, however, give considerable scope to the SEC to insert its views
concerning corporate governance into the workings of public corporations,
either through future enforcement actions or otherwise.
As noted above, one of the matters which must be addressed in a
code of ethics is the prompt internal reporting of violations of the code.
This fits in with the provisions federalizing state law that protect
whistleblowers 63 The whistleblower protection provisions are contained
in three separate sections of Sarbanes-Oxley. First, Sarbanes-Oxley
establishes a civil cause of action that protects employees of publicly traded
companies who assist in the investigation of conduct that the employee
"reasonably believes" is a violation of federal mail, wire, bank, or securities
fraud statutes, any rule or regulation of the SEC, or any federal law
protecting shareholders from fraud."6 Another provision establishes
criminal liability for whistleblower retaliation.'65 Finally, audit committees
of public companies are required to establish procedures for "the receipt,
retention, and treatment of complaints" the company receives regarding
"accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters," and certain
confidential anonymous submissions by employees concerning
questionable accounting or auditing."'
1617 C.F.R. § 229.406(b) (2004).
162See infra text accompanying notes 237-42.
'
6 3See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Whistleblower Protection Under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, N.Y. L. J., June 26, 2003, at 5.
'64Sarbanes-Oxely, § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2002).
1
6 5Sarbanes-Oxley, § 1107, 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (2002).
'"Sarbanes-Oxley, § 301(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(4) (2002).
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D. Audit Committees
The SEC began advocating the value of independent audit
committees as early as 1941,167 but took no action to implement this idea
until the mid-1970s. It then brought several enforcement cases in which
consent injunctions ordered board restructuring so there would be an audit
committee with a majority of unaffiliated or independent directors. 168 In
addition, the SEC used its leverage with the NYSE and other SROs to
persuade them to require an audit committee with a majority of independent
directors as a condition of listing on an exchange. 69 In July 1978, the SEC
proposed management affiliation rules to indirectly encourage corporations
to replace directors, who were officers or otherwise affiliated with a
corporation, with unaffiliated directors. As proposed, these rules would
have required all corporations subject to its proxy rules to label their
directors as "independent" or "affiliated."'70 Although the final rules did
not go this far,' 7' the SEC continued to believe in the value of audit
committees of independent directors.
In September 1998 the heads of the NYSE and the NASD appointed
a Blue Ribbon Committee at the behest of the Chairman of the SEC to
inquire into the adequacy of the audit oversight process by independent
directors. The Committee issued a report recommending that the NYSE
and the NASD require listed companies with a market capitalization above
$200 million to have an audit committee composed solely of independent
directors. 7 2 The Committee also recommended a requirement of financial
1671n re McKesson & Robbins, Inc., Accounting Series Release No. 19 (Dec. 5, 1940),
11 Fed. Reg. 10,918 (Sept. 27, 1946).
168See, e.g., SEC v. Killearn Props., Inc., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,256 (May 1977); SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,807 (Oct. 1, 1974).
16 9See In re NYSE, Exchange Act Release No. 13,346, 11 SEC Docket 1945 (Mar. 9,
1977); AM. LAW INST., supra note 144, § 3.05, cmt. a.
170Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral
Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 14,970, 43 Fed. Reg.
31,945 (July 24, 1978). See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13,901, 42 Fed. Reg.
44,860 (Sept. 7, 1977) (requiring disclosure of any personal or business relationships of any
nominee director).
17 1Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral
Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 15,384, 43 Fed. Reg.
58,522, at 58,524 (Dec. 14, 1978).
172REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE ON IMPROVING
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORPORATE AUDIT COMMITTEES (1999) [hereinafter BLUE RIBBON
COMMITTEE REPORT]. The Committee recommended that members of an audit committee should
be considered independent only "if they have no relationship to the corporation that may interfere
with the exercise of their independence from management." Id. at 10. Examples of questionable
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literacy for audit committee members.' In lieu of rule proposals by the
SEC, the SROs filed proposals for amended listing standards. 74 Following
the collapse of Enron in February 2002, the SEC asked the SROs to further
review their listing requirements with the goal of enhancing the
accountability, integrity and transparency of listed companies. In June
2002, a committee of the NYSE issued a report on possible changes to the
NYSE listing standards.'75  This report contained a variety of
recommendations that went beyond Sarbanes-Oxley, including: requiring
listed companies to have a majority of independent directors, with a
stringent definition of the term "independent"; provision for regularly
scheduled executive sessions of boards chaired by a lead director or
independent chairman; requiring listed companies to have nominating and
compensation committees composed entirely of independent directors; and
requiring shareholder votes on equity-compensation plans.'76 Several of
these recommendations were then filed with the SEC as proposed new
listing standards. Among the NYSE proposals were listing requirements
to the effect that non-management directors must meet at regularly
scheduled executive sessions and that nominating and compensation
committees be composed entirely of independent directors. '77 Nasdaq filed
relationships were: "employ[ment] by the corporation or any of its affiliates for the current year
or any of the past five years"; receiving any compensation other than "for board service or benefits
under a tax-qualified retirement plan";
being a member of the immediate family of an individual who is, or has been in
any of the past five years, employed by the corporation or any of its affiliates as
an executive officer, . . . being a partner in, or controlling shareholder or an
executive officer of, any for-profit business organization
with "significant" transactions with the corporation in any of the past five years; employment "as
an executive of another company where any of the corporation's executives serves on that
company's compensation committee." Id. at 10-11. A "significant" transaction is $200,000 over
a two year period. Id. at 10 (citing AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
§ 1.34(a)(4) (1992)).
'BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 172, at 25-26.
'
74Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by NYSE,
Amending Audit Committee Requirements of Listed Companies, Exchange Act Release No.
41,980, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,514 (Oct. 13, 1999); Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of
Proposed Rule Change By Nat'l Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc. Amending Nasdaq's Audit
Committee Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 41,982, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,510 (Oct. 13,
1999); Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the American
Stock Exchange LLC Amending the Exchange's Audit Committee Requirements, Exchange Act
Release No. 41,981, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,505 (Oct. 13, 1999).
'REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND
LISTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE (June 6, 2002).
761d. at 2-3.
17'See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and
Amendment No. I Thereto by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Corporate
Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 47,672, 68 Fed. Reg. 19,051, 19,054 (Apr. 17, 2003).
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similar listing proposals with the SEC.'78 The SEC finally approved the
revised listing standards by the NYSE and Nasdaq on November 4, 2003.179
Sarbanes-Oxley gave the SEC the authority the agency had long
wanted to restructure corporate audit committees, but it did so primarily by
authorizing the SEC to direct SROs to change their listing rules to meet
certain standards. 8 ° Sarbanes-Oxley also gave the SEC a mandate to
require a public company to disclose whether its audit committee includes
at least one "financial expert."'' The regulation of public company audit
committees by SROs and the substantive standards articulated in Sarbanes-
Oxley, respectively, pushed listing standards further in the direction of
making the audit committee independent. Indeed, the statute took authority
for financial reporting away from management and placed it with the audit
committee. Moreover, it made the audit committee a potential critic and
antagonist of the CEO and CFO. The specific grant of authority to the SEC
to regulate the structure and duties of audit committees was a radical
departure from previous legal theories regarding the divide between federal
and state law.
There are a number of important ways in which Sarbanes-Oxley
altered the structure and work of audit committees. Each member of the
audit committee of a listed issuer must be "independent," and this term was
defined to mean that an audit committee member may not, other than in his
or her capacity as a board member, accept any consulting, advisory, or
other fee compensation from the issuer, or be an affiliated person, the
issuer, or any subsidiary.'82 The audit committee must become directly
.
78See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and
Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the National Assoc. of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Proposed
Amendments to NASD Rules 4200 and 4350 Regarding Board Independence and Independent
Committees, Exchange Act Release No. 47,516,68 Fed. Reg. 14,451,14,453-54 (Mar. 25,2003).
179Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to
Corporate Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 48,445, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 12, 2003)
[hereinafter Listing Rules Approval].
'
8
°Sarbanes-Oxley, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2002).
'
8 1Sarbanes-Oxley, § 407, 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (2002).
'
82Sarbanes-Oxley, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2002). This is more stringent than prior
definitions of independence utilized for listed company audit committees. Prior NYSE listing
rules required all listed domestic companies to establish and maintain audit committees comprised
solely of directors independent of management and free from any relationship that, in the opinion
of its board of directors, would interfere with their exercise of independent judgment as a
committee member. See In re NYSE, Exchange Act Release No. 13,346, 11 SEC DOCKET 1945
(Mar. 9, 1977). Other formulations similarly allowed directors to exercise their business
judgement within generally enunciated rules to determine questions of independence. See, e.g.,
Committee on Corporate Laws, American Bar Association, Corporate Director's
Guidebook-1994 ed., 49 Bus. LAW. 1243, 1257-58, 1264 (1994). The concept of an
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responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work
of any registered public accounting firm employed by the issuer.'83 Audit
committees must establish procedures for receiving, retaining and treating
complaints regarding accounting, internal controls or auditing matters and
the confidential, anonymous submission of concerns by employees of the
issuer regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters. 4 The audit
committee must also have the authority to engage independent counsel and
other advisers and be adequately funded.'85 Although all of these
requirements were to be implemented by SRO rather than SEC rules, the
SROs only have authority to go beyond, not derogate from, these minimum
standards. The SEC was also directed to adopt rules requiring a public
company to disclose whether its audit committee includes at least one
person who is a "financial expert."' 86 Taken as a whole, these rules
undercut the long-standing principle of state law that the entire board of
directors is responsible for directing the management and supervising the
affairs of a corporation.'87 The audit committee is now required to be set
up as a kind of executive committee for certain purposes and the "financial
expert" becomes a super committee member. Further, an adversarial model
of governance is substituted to a certain extent for the traditional collegial
model of board governance. The implications of these changes, in terms of
director liability and board practice, will probably take some time to be felt
and understood.
The SEC implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley requirement that
companies have a "financial expert" on the board or disclose why not,'
also thrust the SEC directly into corporate governance. The SEC's
proposed rule would have defined a "financial expert" to mean "a person
who has, through education and experience as a public accountant or
auditor or as a principal financial officer, controller, or principal accounting
officer of [an SEC reporting company]" or similar position with certain
enumerated attributes: an understanding of GAAP; experience applying
GAAP "in connection with the accounting for estimates, accruals, and
independent director is a fluid one, however, and is difficult to encapsulate in a legislative
definition. See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 808 A.2d 1206 (Del. Ch. 2003).




18615 U.S.C. § 7265 (2002).
'
87See Letter from the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities ofthe American Bar
Association, Section of Business Law, American Bar Association Comment on Proposed
NYSE/Nasdaq Corporate Governance Listing Standards, to SEC (June 2, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse200233/abaO60203.htm.
185 U.S.C. § 7265 (2002).
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reserves" generally comparable to those of the registrant; experience
preparing or auditing financial statements generally comparable to those of
the registrant; "experience with internal controls and procedures for
financial reporting"; and "an understanding of audit committee
functions." '189 Commenters believed that this definition was unduly narrow
and limiting and, in addition, were concerned about the possible personal
liability of the financial expert.19°
In its final rule, the SEC changed the term "financial expert" to
"audit committee financial expert" and required reporting companies in
their annual reports to either disclose that they have at least one such expert
or that there is no such expert and explain why.'91 Such an expert must
have the following attributes: an understanding of GAAP and financial
statements; the ability to assess the general application of GAAP in
connection with accounting for estimates, accruals, and reserves;
experience preparing, auditing, analyzing, or evaluating financial
statements generally comparable to the registrant's; an understanding of
internal controls; and an understanding of audit committee functions.
The proposing release seemed to envision that the audit committee
financial expert would have to be a public accountant or corporate financial
officer. This approach, however, went too far and would have eliminated
such personalities as Warren Buffet and Alan Greenspan from qualifying. '92
Although this formulation did not become final, it demonstrates the dangers
of bureaucratic approaches to corporate governance. In its final rule, the
"
9Disclosure Required by Sections 404,406, and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Securities Act Release No. 8138, 67 Fed. Reg. 66,208, 66,211 (Oct. 30, 2002).
'
90 See, e.g., Comments of Davis Polk & Wardwell on S7-40-02-Disclosure Required
by Section 404,406, and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, at 3 (Nov. 29,2002), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74002/davispolk. l.htm; Comments of Confederation of
British Industry on S7-40-02, SEC Consultation on Proposed Rules Regarding Disclosures
Required by Sections 404, 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, at 1 (Nov. 29, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74002/cedruptl.htm; Comments of Clearly,
Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton on S7-40-02, Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406 and 407 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, at 2 (Nov. 27, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s74002/clearygotl .htm; Comments of the European Commission on S7-40-02, Release
Nos. 38-8138, 34-46701, 1C25775, at 2 (Nov. 29, 2002); Comments of Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson on S7-40-02, Release Nos. 33-8138, 34-46701, 1C-25775, at 3 (Nov. 29,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/propsed/s74002/friedfrankI.htm.
191Regulation S-K, Item 401(h), 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h) (2004). See Disclosure Required
by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Securities Act Release No. 8177,
68 Fed. Reg. 5110 (Jan. 31,2003); Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002; Correction, Securities Act Release No. 8177A, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,353 (Mar. 31,
2003).
925EC Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman, Speech by SEC Commissioner: SEC
Implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley: The New Corporate Governance, available at
http://www/sec/gov/news/speech/spchO40703cag.htm (Apr. 7, 2003).
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SEC recognized that a person could have acquired his or her qualifications
to be an audit committee financial expert though education and experience
as a financial officer or auditor, experience as a supervisor or as a person
assessing the performance of companies or public accountants or "other
relevant experience."'93 Additionally, a safe harbor was crafted for audit
committee financial experts to the effect that such a designation should not
impose any greater duties, obligations or liability than such a person would
have as a member of an audit committee.'94
The notion that an audit committee should have a financial expert
was derived from the recommendation of the NYSE-NASD Blue Ribbon
Committee that audit committee members should be financially literate.
There is nothing wrong with this idea, but to have it encapsulated in a
governmental definition is a mischievous first step toward governmentally
imposed credentials for audit committee members and corporate directors
generally. Corporate law has never imposed qualifications upon directors,
and the SEC should not be given this authority either. Further, the SEC's
assumption in its rulemaking that the audit committee should become some
kind of a super-auditor to audit the auditors is unrealistic. If the audit
committee were to spend the requisite amount of time needed to do such a
job for a large public corporation so many hours would be required that the
compensation for audit committee members would make them non-
independent as a practical matter. If the auditors and the SEC were
unwilling or unable to prevent the financial frauds of Enron and other
bubble companies, directors are not going to be able to do so either,
however well intentioned, independent and expert they might be. The
heightened attention to the possibility of financial fraud that Sarbanes-
Oxley has imposed on corporate boards of directors is undoubtedly
worthwhile, but the inflexible corporate structure now mandated by SEC
rules is troublesome.
E. Regulation of Accountants
The creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB), a new federal watchdog for the regulation of the public
accounting profession, is at the heart of the reforms embodied in Sarbanes-
Oxley, but this new framework only affects corporate governance
indirectly. An explanation of the SEC's efforts and frustrations with regard
to the regulation of auditors is a large topic that goes far beyond the scope
of this article. Nevertheless, the SEC's new power to regulate auditors will
'9917 C.F.R. § 229.401(h)(3) (2004).
94ld. § 229.401(h)(4)(ii).
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be briefly described for two reasons. First, it involves the federalization of
a power previously assigned to the states-the power to license and
discipline accountants. Second, the extent of the SEC's new powers in
combination with the reform of audit committees described above will
impact the corporate governance of public companies because the alliance
of audit committees and auditors has been set up to operate as a
counterbalance to the power of management over financial reporting.
When Congress was debating the passage of the Securities Act,
certain congressmen proposed that a corps of government auditors be
established to audit public companies.195 Congress instead required that
financial statements filed with the SEC be certified by an independent
certified or public accountant and gave the SEC power to prescribe the
detail and content of such financial statements. 196 In addition, the SEC was
empowered to define "accounting, technical and trade terms" and prescribe
the form in which required information should be presented, the items to
be shown in the balance sheet and earning statement, and the methods to be
followed in the preparation of accounts. 97 The SEC adopted Regulation
S-X and similar regulations to implement these provisions,'98 but also
assigned considerable responsibility for formulating accounting principles
to private sector organizations, specifically the FASB and its
predecessors. 99 The continued existence of the FASB and its mission of
establishing GAAP was contemplated by Sarbanes-Oxley, although certain
conditions were attached to its continued recognition as an authoritative
standard setter, including the composition of its board and the source of its
funding, to assure independence from the accounting profession. °°
Until the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, SEC oversight of auditing
practices and standards was much more tenuous. As a general matter, the
licensing and discipline of accountants is conducted by state boards of
accountancy. All accounting firms, however, who practiced before the SEC
were required to join the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) of the American
'
95See, e.g., A Bill to Provide for the Furnishing of Information and the Supervision of
Traffic in Investment Securities in Interstate Commerce: Hearing on S. 875 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 58-59 (1933) (statements of Sen.
Reynolds).
"9Securities Act, Schedule A, Items 25-27, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(25)-(27) (2001).
'
97Securities Act, § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2001).
t9' 17 C.F.R. Pt. 210 (2004).
' See Statement of Policy on Establishment and Improvement of Accounting Principles
and Standards, Accounting Series Release No. 150, 39 Fed. Reg. 1260 (Jan. 7,1974), reaffirming
a policy taken in Accounting Series Release No. 4, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,913 (May 10, 1938).
2
°"See Commission Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a
Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, Securities Act Release No. 8221, 68 Fed. Reg.23,333
(May 1, 2003).
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Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). Discipline was referred
to the AICPA's Professional Ethics Division. The Public Oversight Board
(POB) had oversight responsibilities over SECPS, but, after Enron, a fight
broke out between the POB and the Chairman of the SEC, and the POB
voted to disband.2°'
Auditing standards for accountants who certified financial statements
filed with the SEC were indirectly regulated by the SEC through
enforcement proceedings, but Congress did not give the SEC authority to
formulate or approve auditing standards or otherwise regulate auditing,
with one important exception. The SEC was essentially empowered to
define "independence" for purposes of enabling an auditor to file financial
statements with the SEC.20 2 During the 1990s, the SEC attempted to define
"independence" in such a way as to prevent auditors from consulting for
audit clients, 203 but due to political pressure, was unable to do so. Although
the SEC had long disciplined accountants and accounting firms under Rule
102(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice,2" and this rule was upheld in the
courts, 2° a passionate and "articulate minority" continued to question its
validity.206 Further, it was unclear whether the SEC could sanction
201See Prepared Statement of Mr. Charles A. Bowsher: Hearing on Accounting and
Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking Housing, and Urban Affairs (Jan. 31, 2002), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/02.03hrg/031902.bowsher.htm.
202Securities Act, Schedule A, Items 25, 26, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(25), (26). See Regulation
S-X, Art. 3, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-01.
2
-
3See LEVITT& DWYER, supra note 57, at 125-39; Revision of the Commission's Auditor
Independence Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 7919, [2000-2001 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,406, at 83,989 (Nov. 21, 2000).
2
"
4Until changed by rulemaking pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley, Rule 102(e) purported to
give the SEC authority to discipline and sanction "any person" by means of a suspension or a
permanent bar from practicing before the Commission, if that person was found:
(i) Not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; or (ii) To be
lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper
professional conduct; or (iii) To have willfully violated, or willfully aided and
abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or the rules
and regulations thereunder.
17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2004).
205See Checkosky v. SEC, 139 F.3d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (dismissing disciplinary
proceedings on other grounds); Sheldon v. SEC, 45 F.3d 1515, 1518 (11 th Cir. 1995); Davy v.
SEC, 792 F.2d 1418, 1421-22 (9th Cir. 1986); Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 577-82
(2d Cir. 1979).
206See Paul Gonson, The 1998 Amendment to SEC Rule 102(e) Will Withstand Judicial
Scrutiny, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 609 (1999); Norman S. Johnson & Ross A. Albert, "Dft Vu All
Over Again ": The Securities and Exchange Commission Once More Attempts to Regulate the
Accounting Profession Through Rule 102(e) of Its Rules of Practice, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 553,
580-91.
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accountants for negligent conduct.2"7 Since professional malpractice
utilizes a negligence standard, the SEC's ability to formulate auditing
standards in Rule 102(e) proceedings was questionable. Nevertheless, the
SEC continued to use Rule 102(e) as an enforcement tool against the
auditors of public companies.08
The SEC obtained the power it long sought in Sarbanes-Oxley to
formulate auditing standards and discipline accountants for improper
professional conduct. The heart of the reforms in Sarbanes-Oxley was the
creation of the PCAOB, which is supposed to be neither a self-regulatory
organization nor a government regulator, although it is patterned to some
extent on the NASD. 2°9 The responsibilities of the PCAOB include: the
registration and inspection of all public accounting firms that prepare audit
reports for public companies; the adoption and modification of auditing,
quality control, ethics, independence, and other standards for public
company audits; the investigation of registered firms for violations of rules
relating to audits; and the imposition of sanctions for violations.210 This
federalization of the regulation of auditing standards is a significant change
from prior oversight mechanisms.
Sarbanes-Oxley also has a number of auditor independence
provisions that affect not only auditors, but also audit committees,
executives, and directors of public companies. Most of these provisions
were a response to egregious conflicts of interest at Enron and other failed
companies that the SEC was previously unable to remedy. Under Sarbanes-
Oxley, an auditor for an issuer is prohibited from providing a list of non-
audit services including bookkeeping; financial information systems design;
appraisal or valuation services or fairness opinions; actuarial services;
internal audit outsourcing services; human resources functions; broker-
207See Johnson & Albert, supra note 206, at 592-600.
20
'See id. at 575.
2
°Sarbanes-Oxley, § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2002). The PCAOB is a private sector
organization in the sense that it is funded by fees levied on accountants and issuers. Its board
members are appointed by the SEC after consultation with the chair of the Federal Reserve Board
and the Secretary of the Treasury. Id. § 101(e). Only two members may be CPAs, and if the
chairperson is a CPA, he must have not been practicing as such for five years. Id. § 101(e)(2).
But the PCAOB will have the ability to request the SEC to issue subpoenas and it will have
immunity with respect to its investigative and prosecutorial activities. Id. § 105. Although
questions could be raised concerning the constitutionality of such an entity, the Congress that
passed Sarbanes-Oxley was not interested in fine legal points but in reacting to corporate
scandals. Possible litigation over the funding of the PCAOB and the FASB may be brought on
the theory that assessments are a transfer between private players without sufficient, direct
government oversight of a system being set up under federal law. See Steve Burkholder,
Financial Accounting Standards Board, Trustees Note Possible Legal Challenge to FASB Fee-
Based Funding Mechanism, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1310 (Aug. 4, 2003).
2 1 Sarbanes-Oxley, § 101(c), 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2002).
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dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services; legal or other
expert services unrelated to the audit; and any other services outlawed by
the PCAOB. 21 ' Additionally, the audit committee must pre-approve all
services provided by an auditor.212 The SEC's rule implementing this
provision requires disclosures designed to give investors an understanding
of how the audit committee is managing the company's relationship with its
auditor.213 Other provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley require rotation of an audit
partner every five years, 2 4 and direct the SEC to study the possible
mandatory rotation of audit firms. 215 A conflict of interest provision
prohibits anyone who was employed by an auditor for an issuer from
becoming the CEO, controller, CFO, or chief accounting officer of the
issuer within one year of employment.2t 6
F. Regulation of Attorneys
The SEC's new regulatory authority over attorneys is an additional
topic that gives cause for concern. This issue also indirectly impacts
corporate governance and federalizes an area of the law, which has been
extremely controversial and where the SEC's reach has long exceeded its
grasp. The furor over the SEC's proposed rules implementing Sarbanes-
Oxley with respect to lawyers indicates that this controversy will continue.
Since the SEC's Rule 102(e) and its predecessor Rule 2(e) were
passed, the SEC's disciplinary authority and its enforcement program
against attorneys has been questioned, even by sitting SEC
Commissioners.2 7 Law review articles galore have been written on the
subject.2 18  With Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC finally received legislative
2
"Sarbanes-Oxley, § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(g) (2002).212Sarbanes-Oxley, § 202, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(i) (2002).
213Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities Act Release No.
8220, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003).
21 4Sarbanes-Oxley,§ 203, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(j) (2002).
21 5Sarbanes-Oxley, § 207, 15 U.S.C. § 7232 (2002). Now that there are only four big
firms, thanks to the decision by the Justice Department to close down Arthur Anderson, such a
system would accomplish little. The GAO was instructed to study the concentration within the
accounting profession. Sarbanes-Oxley, § 701, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002).
2 16Sarbanes-Oxley, § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2002).
2 17See In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, 47 S.E.C. 95, 109-12 (1979) (Karmel,
Comm'r, dissenting); In re Allied Stores Corp., No. 3-6869, 1987 SEC LEXIS 4306, at *19
(June 29, 1987) (Fleischman, Comm'r dissenting). See also In re Checkosky, Exchange Act
Release No. 38,183, 63 SEC Docket 1691, 1997 WL 18303, at *14 (Jan. 21, 1997) (Johnson,
Comm'r, dissenting) (arguing that the SEC's use of Rule 2(e), while necessary, has become too
broad).
218 Johnson & Albert, supra note 206, at 563-64 n.33.
2005]
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
blessing for its ability to bring administrative actions against both attorneys
and accountants and to censure, suspend, or bar any person from appearing
or practicing before the Commission." 9 The standard for improper
professional conduct was defined to be "intentional or knowing conduct,
including reckless conduct" and highly unreasonable negligent conduct or
repeated instances of unreasonable negligent conduct.22 In addition to
giving the SEC the power to bring malpractice cases against attorneys,
Sarbanes-Oxley directed the SEC, not later than 180 days after the
enactment of the statute, to issue rules setting minimum standards of
professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the
Commission in the representation of issuers, including a rule requiring an
attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities law, breach
of fiduciary duty, or similar violation by the company or one of its agents
to the chief legal counsel or CEO.22" ' If these officers do not appropriately
respond to the evidence, the attorney must report it to the board's audit
committee, another committee of independent directors, or to the full
board.222 Although this "up the ladder" system of reporting of violations of
law was permitted or even mandated by most state ethics rules applicable
to attorneys, the American Bar Association rules did not go quite so far.223
The American Bar Association subsequently amended its model ethics
219Sarbanes-Oxley, § 602(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78d-3(a) (2002). The grounds for such
disciplinary sanctions are:
(1) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others; (2) to be
lacking in character or integrity, or to have engaged in unethical or improper
professional conduct; or (3) to have willfully violated, or willfully aided and




22 1Sarbanes-Oxley, § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).2221d. This provision was an amendment by Senator Edwards trying to make clear that
a lawyer for a public corporation represents the corporation and its shareholders and not the
corporate officers. See 148 CONG. REc. 5651-52 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (remarks of Sen. John
Edwards).
223 See Pamela Atkins & Joan Rogers, ABA Task Force Revised Proposals on Ethics Rule
Changes Generally Welcomed, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 754 (May 5, 2003). The
Taskforce stopped just short of requiring an attorney to breach confidentiality to prevent serious
financial harm and instead recommended allowing an attorney to act in such a case. Lisa H.
Nicolson, A Hobson's Choice For Securities Lawyers in the Post-Enron Environment: Striking
a Balance Between the Obligation of Client Loyalty and Market Gatekeeper, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 91, 136-37 (2002). In fact, the origin of this provision seems to have been the idea of six
professors of legal ethics who were having a disagreement with the ABA. See The Evolving
Legal and Ethical Role of the Corporate Attorney After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, 52 AM.
U. L. REv. 613, 615-20 (2002) (remarks of Prof. Painter).
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rules to require "up the ladder" reporting to protect a corporate client from
substantial harm.224
The SEC rulemaking proposal to implement the Sarbanes-Oxley
provisions regarding attorneys' professional responsibilities far exceeded
the statutory provisions by including a requirement that any attorney who
reports evidence of a material violation of the securities law or breach of
a fiduciary duty and is not satisfied that the chief legal officer or CEO has
responded appropriately, must make a "noisy withdrawal" from continued
representation of the corporation.225 An alternative proposed by the SEC
was that issuers could form a Qualified Legal Compliance Committee
(QLCC), which would have the responsibility of notifying the SEC of an
attorney's withdrawal. This proposed rule would have covered all
attorneys, licensed in any jurisdiction in the world, who prepare filings or
submissions to the Commission.226
The SEC's proposed rule was an attempt to make corporate attorneys
responsible for documenting their clients' violations of law and then
reporting those violations to a government prosecutor. This proposal
represents a return to the much discredited and ultimately abandoned
whistleblower theory of the SEC in SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp., 227 which was never accepted by any court. The SEC's proposal
included determining questions of attorney-client privilege involved in
whistleblowing, thereby pre-empting any state law rules preventing such
conduct.228 Whether the SEC may pre-empt state laws in this way has been
questioned by at least one state bar association. 29 The proposed rule would
have applied to any breach of fiduciary duty recognized at common law,
and Sarbanes-Oxley admittedly contains the phrase "breach of fiduciary
22
'MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rules 1.13 & cmt. 4, 4.1 (2004). See REPORT OF
THE AMERICAN BARASSOCIATION TASKFORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, Mar. 31,2003,
at 31-64; Greg Pease, ABA Amends Model Ethics Rules to Permit Up the Ladder Reports of
Corporate Wrongs, 35 Fed. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1358 (Aug. 18, 2003). This revised rule
permits attorneys to reveal information outside the organization only to the extent necessary to
prevent substantial injury to the organization. Id.
22 This requirement essentially would require resignation from the engagement and
notification to the SEC. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,
Securities Act Release No. 8150, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670 (Dec. 2, 2002).2261d. at 71,674, 71,677.
227457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978). The National Student court ultimately did not find
the attorneys liable under the proposed whistleblower theory, but instead found violations under
Rule lob-5. Id. at 712-15.
228Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, supra note 225,
at 71,674-75.
229See Washington Ethics Opinion Portends Clash Between SEC, State Rules on
Revealing Fraud, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1334 (Aug. 11, 2003).
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duty or similar violation" in describing the types of problems that must be
reported "up the ladder." Whether Congress meant by these hastily drafted
words to overturn Supreme Court case law and draw a distinction between
the federal securities laws and state corporation laws concerning fiduciary
duty is an interesting question.
After a comment letter process in which there were a multitude of
negative comments, the SEC cut back on its proposal and extended the
comment period on the "noisy withdrawal" provisions .2 30 As an alternative,
the SEC floated the idea of compelling public companies to file a report
with regard to any resignation by an attorney dissatisfied with a corporate
counsel or CEO reaction to evidence of a material violation of securities
law or breach of fiduciary duty.231 Although this story relates primarily to
the federalization of ethics regulation of attorneys, the issue clearly affects
corporate governance.
Attorneys are charged with the zealous representation of their
clients232 and are directed to maintain the confidentiality of client
communications and information so that there will be honest and unfettered
communications between attorneys and their clients.233 Although attorneys
have an obligation of independence, they are agents of their clients, not
adversaries.234 Yet, the SEC seems intent on making attorneys, as well as
accountants, SEC agents for the purpose of policing the securities law
compliance of public companies. Further, the SEC is shifting corporate
governance from a state law model, where a board may at times be
responsive to several constituents, to an exclusive shareholder primacy
model. According to the SEC, this action is necessary because attorneys
are agents of the company shareholders, and those shareholders require
protection.
23 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act
Release No. 8185, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003). The extended sixty day comment period has
long since expired, and the Commission has taken no further action on this proposal.
23
mplementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act
Release No. 8186, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324, 6328 (Feb. 6, 2003).
232See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 Cmt. 1 (2004); NEW YORK CODE
OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (2004).
233See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAWGOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 112, 118-123
(proposed Final Draft No. 1, Mar. 29, 1996); Fellerman v. Bradley, 493 A.2d 1239, 1242 (N.J.
1985).
234See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2004); NEW YORK CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-107 (2004).
[Vol. 30
REALIZING THE DREAM OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS
G. Added SRO Requirements
In June 2002, a committee of the NYSE issued a report on
recommended changes to the NYSE listing standards subsequent to a
request by the chairman of the SEC.235 This report had a variety of
recommendations for changes in NYSE listing standards that went beyond
Sarbanes-Oxley including: a requirement for listed companies to have a
majority of independent directors, with a more stringent definition of the
term "independent"; a provision for regularly scheduled executive sessions
of boards chaired by a lead director or independent chairman; a requirement
that listed companies have nominating and compensation committees
composed entirely of independent directors; and a requirement that
shareholders vote on equity-compensation plans.236 These recommenda-
tions were then transmitted to the NYSE board of directors and several of
them were filed with the SEC as proposed new listing standards.
In addition to proposals that relate to audit committees, the NYSE
proposed requirements that non-management directors meet at regularly
scheduled independent executive sessions and that nominating and
compensation committees be composed entirely of independent directors.237
Similar although slightly different listing proposals were filed with the SEC
by Nasdaq.238 A new listing requirement proposed by both the NYSE and
Nasdaq that shareholders vote on stock compensation plans was approved
by the SEC.239
The final SRO listing rules approved by the SEC implementing
Sarbanes-Oxley include provisions mandating executive sessions of non-
management directors, defining committee independence for audit and
235REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND
LISTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE 1 (June 6, 2002) [hereinafter NYSE CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT].
2 3 6 1d. at 1-2.
23 7See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and
Amendment No. I Thereto by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Corporate
Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 47,672, 68 Fed. Reg. 19,051 (Apr. 17, 2003).
23
'Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and
Amendment No. I Thereto by the Nat'l Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Proposed
Amendments to NASD Rules 4200 and 4350 Regarding Board Independence and Independent
Committee, Exchange Act Release No. 47,516 (Mar. 17,2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro/34-47516.htm.
239See Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving NYSE and Nasdaq Proposed Rule
Changes and Nasdaq Amendment No. 1 and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated
Approval to NYSE Amendments No. 1 and 2 and Nasdaq Amendments No. 2 and 3 Thereto
Relating to Equity Compensation Plans, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 48,108, 68 Fed.
Reg. 39,995 (July 3, 2003).
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nominating committee members, defining audit committee financial
experts, setting forth specific size requirements and obligations of the audit
committee and requiring companies to have codes of business conduct and
ethics.240 Continuing education for directors is suggested.24" ' In some
respects, the NYSE rules are more specific and rigorous than Nasdaq's
rules. For example, the NYSE rules set forth specific requirements for the
charters of nominating and compensation committees, while the Nasdaq
rules do not.242
These are far reaching changes in corporate governance in matters
state law has never regulated, but instead left to the discretion of corporate
boards. On the other hand, the business groups that commented to the
NYSE's Committee on Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards
were in agreement as to the efficacy of the changes the committee
recommended. For example, the Business Roundtable, which sued the SEC
with regard to its authority to promulgate a voting rights rule, expressed the
view that public corporations should have corporate governance and
compensation committees composed of independent directors, that
independent directors should have the opportunity to meet without
management representatives present, and that shareholders should have the
opportunity to vote on stock option and restricted stock compensation plans
in which officers and directors participate.243 The National Association of
Corporate Directors similarly endorsed the idea of independent nominating
and compensation committees and independent director only executive
sessions.2"
Assuming that in today's world both business and government
leaders believe that these are good corporate practices, there is still a
serious question as to whether independent nominating and compensation
committees should be made a matter of federal law. While stock exchange
listing requirements were once a matter of state contract law, they have
24 Listing Rules Approval, supra note 179.
24 Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and
Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Corporate
Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 47,672 (Apr. 11, 2003), at 14-15, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-47672.htm (director orientation and continuing education must
be described in corporate governance guidelines); Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing
of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. I Thereto by the American Stock Exchange LLC
Relating to Enhanced Corporate Governance Requirements Applicable to Listed Companies, File
No. SR-Amex-2003-65, Exchange Act Release No. 48,706, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,109, at 62,119
(Oct. 31,2003) (listed companies urged to develop and implement continuing education programs
for all directors).
242Listing Rules Approval, supra note 179, at 64,158, 64,161-66.
243NYSE CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 235, at A-38-47.
244d. at A-91-92.
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probably been transmogrified into federal law through the Exchange Act.2 45
Yet, whether they have the force of federal regulation, which pre-empts
state law, remains unclear. Where federal law ends and state law begins is
murky. The D.C. Circuit grappled with this issue in Business Roundtable,
but failed to resolve the matter.2" Sarbanes-Oxley clarified the SEC's
authority to mandate the structure of corporate audit committees, but did
not address other board committees or stock option or restricted stock
plans. With respect to audit committees, Sarbanes-Oxley directs the SEC
to set down a standard for stock exchange listing requirements. This is a
sub-delegation of delegated authority, which is troubling as a federal
lawmaking methodology.
If the SEC had not been satisfied with Nasadaq's proposals on board
committees, and had been unable to persuade the NYSE and Nasadaq to
conform their listing standards, could the SEC have passed its own
regulation mandating that all public corporations have nominating and
compensation committees composed entirely of independent directors? In
1979 the SEC flirted with such a rule but backed down, and then Business
Roundtable strongly suggested the SEC had no authority for such
regulation. The question therefore remains whether Sarbanes-Oxley has
altered the balance between state and federal authority over internal
corporate affairs.
H. Shareholder Nominations
Institutional investors include government pension funds, labor
unions, corporate pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and
bank trust departments. In the wake of the financial scandals that exploded
with Enron, some politically motivated institutions and others campaigned
for shareholder nominations to be included on management's proxy
statement. There is nothing to prevent any shareholder from nominating a
director in opposition to a director nominated by a current board, though it
can be a costly endeavor.2 47 Shareholders who desire to use management's
proxy therefore sought a cheaper way to put forward candidates in
opposition to candidates selected by a corporation's current board.
245See Special Study, supra note 69, at 1516-30.
2
"Supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
2 4 7THE CONFERENCE BOARD COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE,
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS PT. 1: EXECUTIVE COMPENSATIONS 16 (2002), available at
http://www.conference-board.org/pdf free/758.pdf [hereinafter CONFERENCE BOARD
COMMISSION].
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Because public pension funds devote an increasing amount of their
assets to equities, they are the most activist institutions on corporate
governance matters and have increasing clout.248 State comptrollers and
treasurers in their capacity as trustees of state employee pension funds, and
trustees of labor union pension funds have been in the forefront of an
initiative to give shareholders a right to nominate directors in opposition to
nominees selected by a board of directors and shift regulation of internal
corporate affairs from state law to federal law. The SEC has responded by
proposing such a rule.249 A group of state pension fund managers from
New York, California, and elsewhere-termed self-declared
"representatives of shareholders"-advocated broad shareholder access to
the company's proxy card on the ground that "[c]ompetition for board seats
and the accountability that contested elections impose will raise standards
for those who serve as directors. '25 ° The American Federation of Labor
and Congress of Industrial Organizations likewise urged shareholder
nominations as "necessary to restore genuine accountability to a boardroom
culture that for too long has been characterized by cozy relationships and
a resulting unwillingness to challenge management., 25  By contrast, the
Business Roundtable attacked the SEC's proposals as presenting "the
possibility of special interest groups hijacking the director election
process."2 2  The politically charged atmosphere may obscure the
complicated and difficult federalism issues raised by the pending
regulation.
The SEC's proposed rule would create a mechanism whereby director
nominees of long-term security holders, or groups of long-term security
holders, with significant holdings could be included in company proxy
materials where there are indications that the proxy process has been
24 Symposium, The Institutional Investor's Goals for Corporate Law in the Twenty-First
Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35, 38-39 (2000).
249Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626,68 Fed. Reg.
60,784 (Oct. 23, 2003).
25 Letter from Alan G. Hevesi et al., Comptroller, State of New York, to Chairman
William Donaldson, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission (Oct. 1, 2003), available
at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/press/news/invest-corp/reforming/10-0l-
03donaldson-letter.pdf. See also Alison Carpenter, AFSCME, CaIPERS Seek Investor Access to
Nomination Process, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1599 (Sept. 29, 2003) (discussing the
increasing number of shareholders advocating for increased access to the board nomination
process).
25
'Letter from Richard A. Trumka, Secretary-Treasurer, The American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Institutional Organizations, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 19,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s7l903/aflcio 21903.htm.
252Rachel McTague, SEC Proposes Groundbreaking Rules on Shareholder Nomination
of Directors, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1689 (Oct. 13, 2004).
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ineffective or that security holders are dissatisfied with that process.253 The
proposal would apply to all companies subject to the proxy rules and once
applicable, shareholder access would apply for two years.254 Two
circumstances would trigger shareholder access: the receipt of more than
thirty-five percent "withhold" votes of any director; or a shareholder
proposal to activate the shareholder access process proposed by a
shareholder or group who have held at least one percent of outstanding
shares for one year and received a majority of shareholder votes cast.255
The names of shareholder nominees proposed through this
mechanism may be submitted by a shareholder or group who have
beneficially owned at least five percent of shares outstanding for at least
two years and express their intent to hold the shares through the annual
meeting. Any shareholder or group nominating a candidate must be eligible
to report beneficial ownership on Exchange Act Schedule 13G and have
filed such a schedule. 256 The candidacy or election of board nominees must
not violate controlling state law, federal law, or the rules of any applicable
national securities exchange or association. Further, the nominee must
satisfy the objective independence criteria of the listing standard applicable
to the issuer and have no specified relationships with the nominating
shareholder or group or agreements with the issuer regarding the
nomination. The maximum number of nominees that may be proposed is
as follows: one nominee if the board has eight or fewer directors; two
nominees if the board has between nine and nineteen directors; three
nominees if the board has twenty or more directors. If a company receives
nominees in excess of the applicable numbers, those nominees from a
shareholder or group with the largest share ownership would be selected as
nominees."'
The SEC's shareholder access proposals were preceded by the
publication of a staff report on shareholder access to proxies 258 and new
disclosure requirements with regard to board nominating committees. 9
The staffreport discussed the possibility that proxy mechanisms could raise
253Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, at 60,785.
2
'4Id. at 60,787, 60,792.
25 1d. at 60,789-92.
2561d. at 60,794.
257Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, at 60,787-88.
2 58Division of Corporation Finance, StaffReport: Review of the Proxy Process Regarding
the Nomination and Election of Directors, Division of Corporation Finance [2003] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) $ 86,938 (July 15, 2003).
259Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications between
Security Holders and Boards of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 48,301,68 Fed. Reg. 48,724
(Aug. 14, 2002) (Proposed Rule).
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questions under applicable state law concerning the triggering of "poison
pill" takeover defenses but suggested ways to encourage shareholder
nominees 26  essentially through methods now proposed by the
Commission.26" ' Although the new disclosure requirements do not raise
federalism issues to the extent that they are raised by the SEC's shareholder
nomination proposals, they nevertheless may intrude on companies'
governance processes governed by state law.
Companies are already required to disclose in their proxy statements
whether they have a standing nominating committee, and if so, to describe
its members, functions and processes, including whether the committee
considers shareholder recommendations for board nominees.262 Under the
SEC's new disclosure rules, beginning January 1, 2004, companies are
required to provide further information about a board's processes for
director selection, its consideration of candidates recommended by
shareholders and the procedure by which shareholders may submit
candidates for consideration to the board. If a company does not have a
nominating committee it will have to state why it does not. If a company
does have a nominating committee it will have to make the charter of the
nominating committee and information on the independence of the
nominating committee available on its website or as an attachment to its
proxy statement at least once every three years. Among other new required
disclosures are a statement as to whether the nominating committee has
received a nomination from a shareholder or a group of shareholders who
beneficially own more than five percent of the company's voting common
shares, a statement as to whether the candidate was nominated by the
committee. Further, issuers will have to describe any minimum director
qualifications sought by its nominating committee, the process by which its
nominating committee identifies and evaluates nominees, and the source for
the recommendation of any nominees such as a security holder, a non-
management director, an executive officer or a third party search firm. 263
Although a variety of questions could be raised about the SEC's
proposal to encourage shareholder access to management's proxy, two
issues are the most important: Does the SEC have the statutory authority to
pass such a regulation; and is it a good idea as a policy matter? At least one
sitting SEC Commissioner has expressed serious doubt about the SEC's
26 0Staff Report, supra note 258, at 87,875-95.
16'Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications Between
Security Holders and Boards of Directors, Securities Act Release No. 33-8340, 68 Fed. Reg.
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authority to promulgate a rule mandating shareholder access to
management's proxy.2" Although the law is not entirely clear, such doubts
are certainly justified.
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to prescribe
proxy rules and regulations as are "necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." '265 In providing for proxy
regulations, Congress assumed that an adequate system of shareholder
voting rights was established under state laws, but sought to protect
investors from the solicitation of proxies by outsiders seeking to take
control of the corporation and also to guard against corporate executives
and directors attempting to perpetuate themselves by misuse of corporate
proxies."' Notwithstanding its potential breadth, section 14(a) has been
interpreted primarily as a disclosure rather than a regulatory provision 67
Federal law, until the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, did not directly
regulate the internal corporate governance of public securities issuers.
Nothing in Sarbanes-Oxley, addresses or enlarges the SEC's authority with
regard to proxy rules. A draft of the initial Exchange Act included a
provision that "nothing in this title shall be construed as authorizing the
[SEC] to interfere with the management of the affairs of an issuer." '268 This
provision was ultimately omitted from the statute. The Supreme Court has
held that the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act require deception,
manipulation or non-disclosure, rejecting the notion that the securities laws
"federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with
transactions in securities, particularly where established state policies of
corporate regulation would be overridden" where clear congressional intent
does not exist.269
In Business Roundtable v. SEC,27° the D.C. Circuit Court invalidated
a SEC rule attempting to regulate corporate deviations from a one share,
one vote regime. The court held that the SEC's rule exceeded the agency's
2
"See Paul S. Atkins, Statement by SEC Commissioner: Remarks at Open Meeting
Regarding Shareholder Access Proposal (Oct. 8, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spchl 01 003psa.htm.
265Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2001).
216S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., at 12 (1934). See also SEC v. Transamerica
Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948) (holding that
Congress's intent to preserve access to corporate nominations cannot be frustrated by corporate
bylaws).
26
'See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964); Roosevelt v. E.I. DU Pont de
Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416,421-22 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
26
'Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, S. 3420, 73d Cong. § 13(d) (1934).
269Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,479 (1977).
270905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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authority under the Exchange Act because if the SEC were permitted to
control the distribution of voting power, it would assume an authority that
the Exchange Act's proponents disclaimed any intent to grant.27' Rather,
Congress believed that so long as investors received enough information,
shareholder voting could work, and therefore it gave the SEC power over
voting procedure instead of substantive control of voting power.
In its rule proposal regulating shareholder access to the proxy
process, the SEC recognized that provisions of state law regarding director
elections are fundamental factors upon which many of the assumptions,
projections and analyses in the proposing release depend although those
provisions are not identified. 2 The proposing release attempts to avoid a
conflict with state law by asserting that its proposed rules are conditioned
on the existence of shareholders rights under state law, but does not cite to
any such laws.2 73 Rather, the proposing release states that a company
would not be required to include a director nominee if that would violate
state law.274
Much could be said about corporate abuses over the past few years
and the detrimental effect of the bursting of the 1990s stock market bubble
on investors and particularly pension fund beneficiaries. Such rhetoric
forms much of the basis for the SEC's new proxy rules. Older Americans
who contemplated retirement are angry, and pension funds are embarrassed.
Still, a large shareholder or group is not necessarily more representative of
the interests of the shareholders as a body, than management and the board
who owe fiduciary duties to all of the shareholders.275 By contrast, one
shareholder or a minority group does not have any fiduciary duties to other
shareholders.276
The SEC twice before proposed the idea of shareholder nominations
as a way to ensure better corporate governance, but backed away for,
among other reasons, doubts concerning its authority to mandate such a
regulation. 277 In the current business-bashing political climate, such doubts
seems to have been pushed aside. They should not be. Regulatory
intrusion into the shareholder nomination process goes to the very heart of
27 Id. at 411.
271Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, at 60,787-97.
2731d. at 60,808.
"741d. at 60,787.
275See DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 560-70 (4th ed. 1993).
276See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 98, at 335-36. A controlling shareholders may have a
duty to minority shareholders, but this is an exception to the general rule. Id.
277Statement by SEC Commissioner Paul S. Atkins, supra note 264.
[Vol. 30
REALIZING THE DREAM OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS
corporate governance and would drastically alter federal and state power
to regulate internal corporate affairs.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF SARBANES-OXLEY
A. Aggressive Enforcement and Overregulation
Sarbanes-Oxley added a host of increased or new civil and criminal
penalties for violations of the federal securities laws and related statutes.
Among other things, Sarbanes-Oxley created a new federal felony for
securities fraud;278 two new anti-shredding penalties;279 broadened the
scope of an obstruction ofjustice crime;28 0 increased the maximum prison
term for mail and wire fraud;2 1 directed the U.S. Sentencing Commission
to review the sentencing guidelines that apply to acts of corporate
misconduct;... created federal protection for whistleblowers; 283 amended
the Exchange Act to increase the criminal penalties for those who file false
statements with the SEC;2 and amended the Employment Retirement
Security Act of 1974 to increase the penalty for criminal violation of
squandering someone's pension.285 In July 2002, a multi-agency task force
was created to consolidate the federal government's prosecution of white-
collar crimes, and, in July 2003, the White House was happy to report that
task-force prosecutors had obtained more than 250 corporate-fraud
convictions or guilty pleas.286 The Chairman of the SEC suggested that this
record of criminal prosecutions had led to a renewed public confidence that
partially accounted for recent stock market strength.287  The SEC is
nevertheless urging Congress to give the agency even more remedies in
administrative actions, make its investigations easier by improving access
278Sarbanes-Oxley, § 807, 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2002).
27 9Sarbanes-Oxley, § 802, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519, 1520 (2002).
2 8 Sarbanes-Oxley, § 1102, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512 (2002).
2
"'Sarbanes-Oxley, § 903, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 1343 (2002).
282Sarbanes-Oxley, § 1104, 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2002).
283Sarbanes-Oxley, §§ 806, 1107, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A(a), 1513 (2002).
284Sarbanes-Oxley, § 1106, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2002).
281Sarbanes-Oxley, § 904, 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (2002).
286See Greg Hitt, Corporate Reform: The First Year: SEC Chief Says Worst of Fraud
Is Likely Past; Federal Task Force Set Up to Investigate Wrongdoing Marks a Year on the Beat,
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to bank records and grand jury information, and remove barriers to the
production of privileged information.288
It could be argued that such prosecutorial zeal is an appropriate
reaction to the infectious greed and financial frauds of the past decade. It
could also be argued that it is inappropriate and bad policy for the SEC to
have the means, as a practical matter, through the new regulatory tools
given by Sarbanes-Oxley, to investigate and prosecute every CEO and CFO
of every public company. Coupled with the SEC's new mandates regarding
corporate governance, the SEC now possesses enormous leverage to shape
the boardroom to fit its ideas about corporate conduct. These ideas are
bureaucratic and based on an adversarial model of corporate structure in
which independent directors wrest control from corporate managers and
become accountable to the SEC as a surrogate for shareholders. Proposals
that thus far have not yet become law, like the initial model for a "financial
expert" '289 and the QLCC,290 suggest the SEC's ambitions to regulate the
corporate boardroom are designed to make the board and its advisors
answerable to the SEC, rather than other constituencies.
Excessively zealous prosecution and overregulation can lead to a
number of results contrary to the interests of shareholders or the public.
Corporate managers and directors may become overly conservative and
adverse to taking risks, concerned more about complying with SEC
regulations than tending to their business affairs.29' Shareholders may
become lulled into thinking the SEC is monitoring corporate behavior so
there is no need for them to do the difficult work of assessing investment
opportunities.292 Smaller companies, unable to bear the costs of compliance
with Sarbanes-Oxley, could also go private to the detriment of existing
public shareholders.293 Finally, accountants and lawyers may become more
concerned about protecting themselves from possible liabilities than
representing client interests.
288See Stephen M. Cutler, Testimony Concerning the Securities Fraud Deterrence and
Investor Restitution Act, H.R. 2179, Before the House Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance,
and GoVt Sponsored Enterprises, Comm. on Fin. Serv. (June 5, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/060503tssmc.htm.
289See supra notes 188-91.
29"See supra notes 223-29.
291
'See Peter J. Wallison, Blame Sarbanes-Oxley, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2003, at A16.
Among other things, the cost of D & 0 insurance is skyrocketing. See Theo Francis, It Still Costs
Big to Insure Against a Boardroom Scandal; Despite the Sarbanes-Oxley Bill, "D&O" Policy
Prices Rise 30%, and Cancellation Clauses Swell, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2003, at C 1.292See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CoRP. L. 1, 41-43 (2002).
293See Peter A. McKay, Though Their Stockls Publicly Held, CompaniesAdopt a Private
Mentality, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2003, at CI.
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On the other hand, all of these horrible consequences may not come
to pass and corporations may instead engage only in honest and transparent
financial reporting. In a report marking the one-year anniversary of
Sarbanes-Oxley, the House Financial Services Committee expressed the
view that the statute had led to improvements in accounting, auditing and
corporate governance and that startup costs for implementing the act had
been unsubstantial.294  Further, the Report asserted that there was no
evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley was creating a trend toward going private.295
The current chairman of the SEC similarly expressed the view that
Sarbanes-Oxley has restored investor confidence in the securities
markets.296
Much of the criticism of Sarbanes-Oxley by the business community
has centered on section 404 and PCAOB Auditing Standard 2.297 These
rules require auditors to do a full scale audit of a company's internal
controls and then opine on their effectiveness.298 It has been estimated that
this effort may increase auditing costs of U.S. companies by forty
percent. 299 The chairman of the NYSE has questioned whether the cost of
compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley is worth the cost.3"0 Still, some believe
that the corporate backlash against these costs proves that Sarbanes-Oxley
is a good law.30' A former Federal Reserve Board chairman and former
SEC chairman have argued that the burdens of Sarbanes-Oxley are worth
its costs. 3° 2
294HOUSE COMM. ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 107TH CONG., REBUILDING INVESTOR
CONFIDENCE, PROTECTING U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: THE FIRSTYEAR
(Comm. Print 2003) available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/Sarbanes-
Oxley0/o20One%2OYear/o2OLater.pdf.
2951d. at 22.
296See Hitt, supra note 286, at C9.
297See Management's Reports on Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting and
Certification in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8392, 2004 WL
349829 (June 5, 2003); PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 2: An Audit of Internal Control Over
Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction With an Audit of Financial Statements (Mar. 9,
2004).
298See John C. Coffee, Jr., Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 and Auditing Standard No. 2,
N.Y.L.J. (May 20, 2004).
29Id. at 3. It has been estimated that the increased auditing costs of foreign companies
will increase by one hundred percent. See John Thain, Sarbanes-Oxley: Is the Price Too High?,
WALL ST. J., May 27, 2004, at A20.
3
°Thain, supra note 299.
30 See Long & Short Corporate Regulation Must Be Working-There's a Backlash, WALL
ST. J., June 16, 2004, at Cl.
3 2See Paul Volcker & Arthur Levitt, Jr., In Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, WALL ST. J.,
June 14, 2004, at A16.
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During the one year since Sarbanes-Oxley was passed, a multi-
agency task force obtained 250 corporate fraud convictions or guilty pleas,
including those of twenty-five CEOs.0 3 When a high percentage of public
corporations and their chief executive and financial officers have engaged
in the dissemination of fraudulent financial information, it may be
concluded that there has been a serious ethical failure in the top echelons
of the business community and that the proper response is new regulation
and a prosecutorial crackdown on white collar criminals. On the other
hand, one could conclude that the regulatory system and financial reporting
standards are faulty and that more of the same-more financial regulation,
more prosecutions, more power to the SEC-will not solve the underlying
economic, political and sociological causes of the 1990s stock market
bubble and its inevitable collapse. Causes other than executive misconduct
could be found. The sheer complexity of financial reporting could lead to
a search for a better accounting framework.3 °4 The disconnect between tax
and financial reporting and the resulting distortions in corporate finance
caused by tax law and policy could be addressed.0 5 The relentless push by
institutional investors for ever-increasing quarterly earnings was
irresponsible and unhealthy, but the only way in which the SEC addressed
investor obsession with quarterly results was through a regulation dealing
with inside information abuses.3" 6 Since SEC regulatory policy is based on
investor protection, the SEC is disinclined to focus on questionable
behavior by investors and portfolio managers because this might unmask
the fiction upon which all SEC financial regulation is based.
The focus of enterprise should be on business profitability. This
focus is increasingly difficult in a complex, highly competitive global
economy where there is a demand for ever greater productivity. Without
3 3See Hitt, supra note 286.
3
"The SEC has begun to address this problem. See Staff of Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Study
Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the U.S.
Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based Accounting System, at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.htm.
305See Gil B. Manzon, Jr. & George A. Plesko, The Relation Between Financial and Tax
Reporting Measures of Income, 55 TAx L. REv. 175, 181-82 (2002). Stock options are a
deduction for corporate tax purposes but not for financial reporting purposes. See id. at 190-92;
Constantine N. Katsoris, Symposium Addendum, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. S47, S49-S51
(2002). Perhaps this led to an unhealthy reliance on stock options as corporate compensation
mechanisms.
306Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, 65 Fed.
Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000).
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condoning the "infectious greed"3 °7 of the higher echelons of corporate
America in the 1990s, or the intentional manipulation of financial reporting
at many corporations, this article questions the Sarbanes-Oxley solutions
of imposing more regulations on public companies and increasing the
sanctions for financial fraud. The financial misreporting at Enron,
Adelphia, WorldCom, and elsewhere was already illegal, indeed criminal.
Sarbanes-Oxley has caught the attention of corporate managers and
directors and no doubt will result in better financial disclosure, at greatly
increased expense, for the immediate future. But will it prevent a
reoccurrence of irrational exuberance and financial fudge at the top of the
next bull market? Perhaps more importantly, will officers and directors and
their accountants and attorneys become so bogged down in procedures to
comply with Sarbanes-Oxley that they have no time for core business
decision making, problem solving, and strategic thinking?0. Although the
problems with regard to practical implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley and
the federalization of corporate governance are separate issues, these issues
are related. State law regulation of corporate governance has been largely
permissive with flexible judicial oversight and has encouraged
differentiation and experimentation. Federal regulation under Sarbanes-
Oxley, on the other hand, is proscriptive and applies to all public
companies regardless of their size, age, or business structure.
B. Federalization of Corporate Governance
William 0. Douglas envisioned a federal agency with the mandate
to regulate large multinational corporations by directing their governance.
Realizing that this was a task too great for a small agency like the SEC, he
set forth a model of self-regulation with business codes of conduct to be
developed by business leaders under government oversight. This was a
model designed to save capitalism during the Great Depression when even
Americans were flirting with the idea that socialism might be better than
the existing economic system that had failed so badly. Has the vision of
William 0. Douglas finally been realized in Sarbanes-Oxley? The answer
is not yet, but the groundwork has been laid.
3
°'Alan Greenspan is reported to have said: "[A]n infectious greed seemed to grip our
business community, our historical guardians of financial information were overwhelmed." John
M. Berry, Fed Chief Says Economy is on Recovery Path, WASH. POST, July 17, 2002, at AO1.
3
.See Chandler & Strine, supra note 34, at 7-8, 46. The cost of Sarbanes-Oxley is not
only the out of pocket costs to lawyers and accountants to assure regulatory compliance with
bureaucratic regulations, but also the cost in management time and attention. See Deborah
Solomon & Cassell Bryan-Low, Companies Complain About Cost of Corporate-Governance
Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2004, at Al.
2005]
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
The creation of the PCAOB may be seen as the kind of regulatory
initiative that Douglas had in mind when describing the relationship
between securities regulation and business. This model has not yet been
imposed on business generally, but rather only the accounting profession
now dominated by four large multinational firms. If the SEC eventually
obtains the ability to license and discipline all executive officers and
directors of public companies, one can envision the creation of a self-
regulatory organization like the NASD to develop fair and equitable
standards of business conduct and to then extend the SEC's prosecutorial
powers by disciplining its members for failure to live up to those standards.
In the wake of the scandals over executive compensation at the NYSE,
there have been calls for the creation of a body like the PCAOB to oversee
the regulation of listed companies.3 °" Before the next series of financial
scandals occur, it might be worthwhile for policy makers to inquire whether
this is the kind of regulatory infrastructure that would serve the country
well.
The keystone of the SEC's corporate governance policy is the
independent director. The author has long felt that this model is flawed.3"'
Independent directors are part-time participants in a corporation's affairs.
By definition they are outsiders. However intelligent, hardworking or
strong-minded they may be, they do not have the time or the mandate to
challenge management's judgements, except as to a discrete number of
issues. If they spend all of their time trying to audit the auditors and assure
that executive compensation is reasonable, then they will have no time to
focus on important business and strategy matters. If they become
essentially full-time directors, then they will no longer be independent. If
they repeatedly challenge the judgments of a CEO, then the CEO will lose
authority and be forced to resign. Corporations are essentially hierarchical
and need a strong leader. Some of the most highly regarded U.S.
corporations have had authoritarian CEOs who have rewarded shareholders
over a long period of time.31' This does not mean that independent
directors are a bad idea, but corporations should have greater freedom to
experiment with board structures than Sarbanes-Oxley permits. Further,
3
°See Rachel McTague, New York Stock Exchange Consumer Federation Believes
Solution to NYSE Governance Is "Single Regulator," 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1659
(Oct. 6, 2003).
3 10See ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VERSUS CORPORATE AMERICA 163-64 (1982); Roberta S. Karmel, The
Independent Corporate Board. A Means to What End?, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv.534 (1984).
3 11The corporations run by Warren Buffet (Bershire Hathaway), Jack Welch (General
Electric), and Bill Gates (Microsoft) come to mind as examples. See Helen Stock, Buffet
Admonishes Fund Directors, WASHINGTON POST. Mar. 7. 2004. at A15.
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since the independent director board simply cannot carry the freight the
SEC has placed upon it, it is bound to disappoint and cause investor and
public dissatisfaction as well as a loss of confidence. The collegial board
has its flaws and there are times when management deserves to be
challenged and even thrown out of office, but the prevailing model has
actually served the U.S. economy well over a long period of time. The
consequences of changing it, and giving control of board structure to a
federal government agency are unknown.
In addition to setting up an adversarial relationship between the
board, and especially the audit committee and the CEO, Sarbanes-Oxley
has given the SEC extensive authority over CFOs and outside auditors and
attorneys, which the SEC is likely to use to set up adversarial tensions with
CEOs. Indeed, one of the most important consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley
is that it has strengthened the SEC's authority to regulate CFOs.312 The
proposed "noisy withdrawal" provisions and the idea of a QLCC are
examples of the premises underlying the SEC's implementation of
Sarbanes-Oxley. In the view of the SEC, different players on the corporate
team should be watching one another suspiciously to assure compliance
with the federal securities laws, and should be prepared to blow the whistle.
Although such checks on the power of a bad CEO may be salutary, such
checks on the power of a good CEO may undermine his or her leadership
to the point of diminishing the competitiveness of a business corporation.
Perhaps business leaders deserve enhanced scrutiny in view of their
wrongdoing during the 1990s, but whether the prescriptions of Sarbanes-
Oxley will benefit the national economy over time is unclear.
C. Effect on State Law
There are two opposite paths state law could take as a result of
Sarbanes-Oxley. State officials may try to be stricter policemen than the
SEC under state anti-fraud statutes and in judicial decisions involving
corporate governance. On the other hand, state law could atrophy with
respect to corporate governance matters. The first response is evident in
the actions by the New York Attorney General in cases involving post-
Enron scandals on Wall Street. With respect to the regulation of research
analysts, the Attorney General instituted prosecutions against the largest
Wall Street firms at a time when rulemaking and enforcement cases were
312See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate
Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859 (2003).
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pending at the SEC.3 13 State attorney generals similarly took the lead away
from the SEC with regard to illegal mutual fund trading.3"4 The second
response is evident in the failure of the states to adopt legislation requiring
corporations to provide their shareholders with annual financial reports.
State blue sky commissioners and attorney generals have not
traditionally utilized blue sky laws to sue public companies or their officers
or directors for fraud. Yet, some of these statutes are very broad and could
be utilized in such a fashion. The New York Martin Act, for example,
prohibits any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud or obtain money by
means of any false pretense, representation or promise, fictitious or
pretended purchase or sale, any concealment, suppression, fraud, false
pretense or false promise in connection with the sale of securities, or
offering investment advice.315 The New York Attorney General has taken
the position that no purchase or sale of stock is required, nor are intent,
reliance or damages required elements of a violation of the Martin Act, in
3 The SEC approved new NASD Rule 2711 and amendments to NYSE Rule 472 with
respect to research analysts and research reports on May 10, 2002. Self-Regulatory
Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. and the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and Notice of Filing and Order Granting
Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 2 to the Proposed Rule Change by the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and Amendment No. I to the Proposed Rule Change by the
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest, Exchange Act
Release No. 45,908, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,968 (May 16, 2002). On May 21, 2002, the New York
Attorney General announced an agreement by Merrill Lynch to enact "significant and immediate
reforms that will further insulate securities research analysts from undue influence from its
investment banking division" and to change the way analysts are compensated. Press Release,
Office of N.Y.S. Attorney General, Spitzer, Merrill Lynch Reach Unprecedented Agreement to
Reform Investment Practices, at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/may/may2la 02.html.
(May 21,2002). This competition between the SEC and Eliot Spitzer continued as further actions
were brought both with regard to research analysts and underwriters. See Kip Betz & Richard
Hill, Regulation of Securities: Financial Services Chairman, SEC Talking About Role of State
Securities Regulators, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 643 (Apr. 21, 2003). Pending legislation
would require the states to remit any civil penalties or disgorgement from prosecutions that set
national market system standards to the SEC. Securities Fraud Deterence & Investor Restitution
Act, H.R. 2179 § 8(b), 108th Cong. (2003).
314See Richard Hill, Conn. Regulator Declares State Oversight of Industry Trumps
Distant Federal Efforts, 35 Sec. Reg. Law Rep. (BNA) 2103 (Dec. 15, 2003); Kip Betz & Rachel
McTague, Spitzer Brings Criminal Charges, SEC Sues Over Alleged Late Trading in Funds, 35
Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) 2018 (Dec. 8, 2003); Phyllis Diamond & Kep Betz, Invesco, Its CEO
Face SEC, NY. Charges Over Market Timing, 35 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (BNA) 2020 (Dec. 8,2003);
Martha Kessler, Mass. Regulators Charge Prudential Over Late-Trading Issues, 35 Sec. Reg.
L. Rep. (BNA) 2100 (Dec. 15, 2003); Rachel McTague, Kerry Introduces Mutual Fund Measure
to Address Trading Abuses, Fee Issues, 35 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) 2033 (Dec. 8, 2003).
3 15N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352(c) (McKinney 1996).
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contrast to section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.3" 6 Although the NSMIA
prohibits any state from directly or indirectly prohibiting, limiting, or
imposing any conditions on the use of any proxy statement, report to
shareholders, or other disclosure documents relating to a covered
security,3 17 there is an exception for "the laws, rules, regulations, or orders,
or other administrative actions of the State of incorporation of the
issuer. '3 8 Thus far, the New York Attorney General has not used the
Martin Act in connection with post-Enron scandals against broker-dealers
and their customers, though he has shown a willingness to go into other
areas.3 19 Whether the New York Attorney General and other similar state
officials will be so inspired by their financial and political success in cases
against broker-dealers and tobacco companies as to sue issuers of
fraudulent financial statements remains to be seen. ° It would not be the
first time that multiple law enforcement officials "pile on" in cases
involving egregious facts. Further, it is unclear whether Congress will have
the desire to further preempt state action in favor of SEC regulation.32" '
State legislation in response to Sarbanes-Oxley is also possible. For
example, two Delaware Chancery Court judges have suggested that the
Sarbanes-Oxley reforms will result in boards with few officers and,
therefore, the traditional Delaware method for testing breaches of fiduciary
duty in suits against directors may not be adequate in the future. Therefore,
they recommend that the Delaware legislature consider amending Delaware
corporate law so that officers are liable for breaches of fiduciary duty even
3
"
6Aff. in Support of Application for an Order Pursuant to General Business Law Section
354, at 7, In re Eliot Spitzer (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Apr. 2002) (No. 02-4015-22), at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf.
3 17A covered security is, essentially, a security listed on a national securities exchange or
Nasdaq. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(2) (2001).
311 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(2)(B) (2001). There is also an exception permitting any "[sitate to
investigate and bring enforcement actions with respect to fraud or deceit, or unlawful conduct by
a broker or dealer, in connection with securities or securities transactions." 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1)
(2001).
3 9See Press Release, Office ofN.Y.S. Attorney General, Galvin, Spitzer Announce Joint
Inquiry into Sale of Mutual Funds by Morgan Stanley, at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
press/2003/julI/jull4a 03.html (July 14, 2003).
32
°See Russell Gold & Andrew Caffrey, United Crime Buster-Chasing Bad Guys
Together, State Attorneys General Win Big Cases, Attain New Clout, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2002,
at B 1. Recoveries from these settlements have been used to help balance state budgets in difficult
economic times, a possible spur to further activism by state blue sky commissioners and attorney
generals. Id. A recent North Carolina statute strengthened its securities laws to prohibit the use
of a deceptive device to manipulate the market, including issuance of false or misleading financial
statements. 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 413.
32 tSee Hill, supra note 92.
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if they are not directors.322 They also recommend that Delaware consider
new regulation of the director election process to install a more open
process for the election of directors.323 The SEC is also considering how
to make the director selection process more open, an example of what may
become a competitive race between the SEC and the states for further
reform.324 States may also believe that new legislation is necessary
concerning the disciplining of accountants and attorneys, since the SEC can
prevent a professional from practicing before the SEC but cannot disbar a
professional for all purposes.
Traditionally, derelictions of duty by officers and directors have been
tested in derivative actions or injunctive actions in state courts. Since
Sarbanes-Oxley does not create new civil liabilities, with a few
exceptions,325 failure to comply with its provisions may result in state court
actions. This could involve suits over failure to comply with stock
exchange listing requirements or executive compensation, among other
things.326 Civil litigation under the federal securities laws has given rise to
many corporate governance reforms.327 It can be anticipated that this trend
will continue under Sarbanes-Oxley in the state courts as well as in the
federal courts.
A very different reaction to Sarbanes-Oxley may be a hollowing out
of state law protections for shareholders as the result of a comprehensive
federal regulatory scheme. This can result in a kind of defacto, as opposed
to a de jure, preemption. Although state law could legally impose
shareholder protection requirements on corporations, they would be
duplicative of federal regulation, and therefore of little practical value or
efficacy under a cost-benefit analysis. One of many examples that could
be chosen is the failure of state law to develop a requirement that
corporations provide their shareholders with annual financial statements.
The obligation to provide shareholders with an annual financial
statement in advance of an annual meeting was first imposed upon public
companies by a NYSE listing requirement.328 This obligation was then
picked up in the Exchange Act, initially as to listed companies and later to
322Chandler & Strine, supra note 34, at 72-3. They point out that this will involve
changes not only to the substantive law, but the service of process provisions.
3231d. § 5.
324See supra text accompanying notes 246-57.
321An exception is section 306(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley, 15 U.S.C. § 7244(a) (2002), which
creates liability for insider trading during pension fund blackout periods.
326Chandler & Strine, supra note 34, §§ 3, 5.
327Thompson & Sale, supra note 312, at 903-04.
328 Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of Corporate Governance Listing Standards
Under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 Bus. LAW. 1461, 1467-68 (1992).
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almost all publicly held companies.3 29  Although the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act requires that every corporation must furnish to
its shareholders annual financial statements, including a balance sheet and
an income statement,330 most state corporation law statutes do not require
corporations to provide shareholders with annual financial statements.
Some states, like New York and New Jersey, provide that upon a
shareholder's request such financial information must be furnished.33'
California follows the Revised Model Business Corporation Act and
requires a board of directors to send an annual financial report to
shareholders containing a balance sheet and an income statement.
332
Delaware has no requirement that shareholders be furnished annual
financial statements. While state corporation law is often criticized for
being overly protective of managers and not sufficiently protective of
shareholders,333 in an area where federal law is so comprehensive and
detailed, such as the financial disclosure provisions of the federal securities
law, there is little incentive for states to enact legislation. Indeed,
businesses would likely complain about redundancy and unnecessary costs
of compliance.
One problem with the allocation of responsibilities for shareholder
protection, however, is that smaller companies are either excessively
regulated if they have become public or hardly regulated at all if they have
remained private. Although the SEC and the SROs have paid some lip
service to the problems that smaller public companies may have in
complying with Sarbanes-Oxley, few concessions have been made to
them.3 34 By contrast, non-public companies will not be subject to any of
329Initially the Exchange Act regulated only listed issuers, but in 1964 was amended to
extend to almost all public companies. These are commonly known as registered and reporting
companies. See 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2002). Issuers which are registered and reporting companies
must send shareholders annual audited financial statements prior to their annual meetings. See
id. § 78n-1.
33 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 16.20 (rev. 2002).
33 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-28 (West 2003); N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 624(e) (2003).
332CAL. CORP. CODE § 1501(a) (West 1990)
3
a
3 See Cary, supra note 42, at 670-72; Comment, Vestiges of Shareholder Rights Under
the New Delaware Corporation Law, 57 GEO. L. J. 599 (1969); Comment, Law For Sale: A
Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 861 (1969).
334See Chairman William H. Donaldson, Testimony Concerning Implementation of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, available athttp://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/090903tswhd.htm (Sept. 9,2003), at 19;
Summary of Comments: Related to Proposed Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit
Committees, Securities Act Release No. 8173, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
extra/s70203summary.htm (Mar. 25, 2003), at 45; Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit
Committees, Securities Act Release No. 8220 (Apr. 9, 2003), at 32.
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the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms unless there is state legislation passed
addressing board structure and composition.
D. The Shareholder Primacy Model
Sarbanes-Oxley is premised on a shareholder primacy model. Since
the SEC is charged with investor protection, all of its policies necessarily
take that objective into account. Yet, shareholders have changed
dramatically since 1934 when the SEC was created. Instead of individual
retail shareholders, the stock market is dominated by institutional investors
who rely on their portfolio managers for decisions as to when to buy and
sell stocks. Institutions owned 61.4% of the equity in the top 1,000
corporations in 2000, and 55.8% of equities in the market overall in
2001."' While some of these investors hold for the long term, many do
not. Average turnover on the NYSE was only 19% in 1970, but increased
to 36% in 1980, 46% in 1990 and by 2001 was 100%.336 Further, their
portfolio managers are interested in quarterly performance, not long-term
returns. This is not a healthy environment in which to expect shareholders
to monitor corporate governance.
Many of the evils of the dot-coin bubble were caused by institutional
investors and their portfolio managers, who first insisted that corporate
officers have equity interests in their companies instead of relying upon
cash compensation and who then pressured issuers to achieve higher
earnings every quarter. Compensated with stock and stock options, CEOs
and other officers and directors naturally became preoccupied with share
prices instead of earnings per share or price earnings ratios. Even outside
advisors, including attorneys, caught this equity fever and came to be
compensated in stock options. 37 Director pension plans were eliminated
on the theory that they made directors think more like employees than
stockholders, and they were generally replaced with stock option plans.338
3 5CONFERENCE BOARD COMMISSION, supra note 247, at 25.
3361d. at 26.
337See Christine Hurt, Counselor, Gatekeeper, Shareholder, Thief: Why Attorneys Who
Invest in Their Clients in a Post-Enron World Are "Selling Out, "Not "Buying In," 64 OHIO ST.
L.J. 897, 911-13 (2003). This creates conflicts of interest and undermines the lawyers role as a
gatekeeper. Id. at 933-38. Cf. James D. Cox, The Paradoxical Corporate and Securities Law
Implications of Counsel Serving on the Client's Board, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 541, 557-60 (2002)
(arguing that attorneys who become involved in corporate management have significant exposure
to liability under section 11 of the Securities Act).
... In fact, a pension plan can encourage a director to think like a creditor-which might
not have been such a bad result for the many high flying companies now in bankruptcy.
Nevertheless, corporations were urged to compensate directors in stock and stock options. See
Edward S. Adams, Corporate Governance After Enron and Global Crossing: Comparative
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Sarbanes-Oxley reinforced rather than questioned this shareholder primacy
model.
Yet, Sarbanes-Oxley also makes shareholder primacy something of
a legal fiction. For purposes of service on the audit committee, a director
is deemed "independent" by Sarbanes-Oxley only if he is not an "affiliated"
person of the company or one of its subsidiaries.339 This was interpreted in
SRO rulemaking as ownership often percent or more of an issuer's equity
securities.34 Therefore, venture funds, leveraged buy-out owners or other
large stockholders who are not managers of the corporation may not serve
as audit committee directors, and if the audit committee definition of
independence is carried over onto the compensation and nominating
committees, will not be able to serve as directors at all. Yet, these are the
very stockholders who have the greatest incentive to assure that a
corporation's financial reporting and compliance with other securities law
requirements are up to standard. If managers who own shares and major
shareholders are not fit to serve as directors, and a high percentage of other
shareholders operate as traders rather than owners, exactly which
shareholders is the SEC protecting?
While a discussion of problems with the shareholder primacy model
goes beyond the scope of this article, these problems are significant to a
consideration of whether Sarbanes-Oxley is an appropriate solution to the
problems of the wave of financial fraud that broke out in the 1990s.
Moreover, the SEC may be embarked on a program to push the reforms of
Sarbanes-Oxley further by mandating contested elections for corporate
directors. This notion has unleashed a barrage of negative comment
because it would upend the selection of corporate directors in the United
States and give institutional shareholders the power to challenge CEOs and
other managers. Many of these shareholders are short-term traders who
have no real interest in a corporation's long-term business success. Many
others are political players, such as state and local governmental pension
funds. Some shareholders might well be appropriate and responsible
parties to propose replacements for ineffective board members, but before
such a radical reform is instituted the SEC should further consider whether
further reinforcement of the shareholder primacy model is a good idea. If
Lessons for Cross-National Improvement, 78 IND. L. J. 723, 743 (2003). See also Robin
Goldwyn Blumenthal, Director's Cut: Study Links Corporate Performance to Boards' Equity
Stakes, BARRON'S, Aug. 2, 1999, at 22 (describing director compensation stock options as a good
method of ensuring loyalty).
33 9Sarbanes-Oxley, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(3)(B) (2002).
34 Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities Act Release No.
8220, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788, at 18,793 (Apr. 16, 2003).
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shareholders are to be given more power, they should also be allocated
much more responsibility for assuring long-term corporate success.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1937, when the president of the NYSE was caught
misappropriating a client's securities, the gleeful reaction of William 0.
Douglas, then chairman of the SEC, was that "the Stock Exchange was
delivered into my hands." '341 Douglas was then able to investigate the
NYSE and disclose "the whole anatomy of Wall Street chicanery and
corruption" and arrange for the appointment of William McChesney Martin
as chairman.342 The reaction of the SEC to the financial scandals that
preceded the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley was similar. Corporate America
was finally delivered into the hands of the SEC because of widespread
chicanery and corruption during the dot-com boom years. The imperial
CEOs of large public companies could finally be brought to heel and some
to jail. The SEC could at last obtain the power to direct the corporate
governance of public companies.
Is this simply a matter of politics and wresting power from business
into the hands of government, or has the SEC long had a vision of the
purpose of enterprise that is different from the vision of business leaders?
If one returns to the initial criticism that William 0. Douglas made of the
Securities Act, during the year after its passage, the answer could be yes.
Douglas asserted that the Securities Act was politically significant. "It is
symbolic of a shift of political power. That shift is from the bankers to the
masses; from the promoter to the investor. It means the government is
taking the side of the helpless, the suckers, the underdogs." '343 Then
Douglas expressed the view that the Securities Act "falls far short of
making significant progress because of the really superficial way in which
it covers the object of its control. It is safe to say that the greatest impact
of the Act is on well-established going concerns . . . ."" According to
Douglas, what was needed instead of a full disclosure statute was serious
merit regulation.
It is apparent that the thing industry needs is constructive
planning and organization conditioned by the requirements of
the public good. When these become articulate, security
34 1WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST YOUNG MAN 289 (1974).
342Id. at 290-91.
34 3Douglas, supra note 8, at 522.
3441d. at 527.
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regulation will be seen to be an integral part of the whole
programme of industrial organization and regulation.... Any
comprehensive and consistent control of the type which...
the New Deal envisage[s] must inevitably embrace within it
control over security issues. That in essence means control
over access to the market.
345
The debate over the efficacy of the Securities Act in which Douglas
participated resonates in the debate today over Sarbanes-Oxley. There is
no doubt that Sarbanes-Oxley has been politically significant. Some claim
that it is extremely important and far reaching legislation that will restore
investor confidence.346 Others argue that it is superficial and a ploy to
bolster the status quo.347 It is unlikely that the current SEC operating in a
very conservative administration is planning to implement a New Deal
merit regulation system where only corporations with good corporate
governance will be allowed to access the capital markets. But one of the
arguments this article sets forth is that the SEC is an agency with a very
long institutional memory that has always acquired more power in response
to crisis and scandal, and the future use it may make of the additional
power it has acquired pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley is unknown. The SEC
now has the leverage to impose its model of corporate governance-a board
of independent directors serving as a check on the CEO; a regulated CFO;
and auditors and attorneys who must divide their allegiance to their clients
with an allegiance to the SEC-on SEC registered corporations. The next
step in these reforms will be greater shareholder democracy, whatever that
means. The questions that deserve some debate are: What are the
objectives or ends to be served by this reformed corporate governance?
Will the SEC try to ameliorate the profit motive to serve general social
needs or will the SEC be concerned with total return to shareholders over
time? Will problems of agency capture result in an alliance between the
SEC and big business which will stifle competition and be detrimental to
entrepreneurial activity by small business or startups?
3451d. at 530-31.
3
"Sara Hansard, The Word in Washington: Passage of Law is Just a Start, INVESTMENT
NEWS, Aug. 4, 2003, at 3; Joshua Chaffin & Adrian Michaels, SEC Chief Set to Prioritise
Executive Pay Reform, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 31, 2003, at 29.
34 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxey Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric,
Light Reform (and It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 917-923 (2003); Jeffrey L.
Oldham, Taking "Efficient Markets" Out of the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine After the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 97 Nw. U.L. REV. 995, 998 n.20 (2003); Alison Grant, Law
Helps to Restore Investor Confidence, THE PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 21, 2003, at G 1.
2005]
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
There are two important justifications for federal securities
regulation. One is to foster investor confidence in order to encourage
capital formation; the other is to put reasonable safeguards around the
pension fund savings of millions of workers. To some extent these
justifications are contradictory, not complementary. While many dot-coms
went bust, many others have become scions of American industry and
stalwarts of the U.S. economy. Without free access to capital, these new
enterprises would not have flourished. On the other hand, when the stock
market collapsed after the dot-com bubble, many Americans lost their
retirement savings. Still it is unclear how Sarbanes-Oxley and its future
administration by the SEC will address these needs of the national
economy. Much of the legislation, and much of the SEC's efforts since it
was passed, are intended to punish those businessmen and women who
failed and whose companies went down in financial scandal. While after
the fact enforcement, which is the SEC's strongest suit, may give some
satisfaction to those who lost their jobs and their savings, it is not a
substitute for the encouragement of capital formation and the protection of
pension fund investments.
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